Western leaders should not wait until Uganda starts to burn

There is increasing political, economic, social and ecological evidence that Uganda is heading for a deadly collision between the rulers and the ruled. It appears that Uganda leaders and development partners have not learned from Uganda’s history since the 1960s.

The second half of the 1960s was characterized by a serious political and constitutional crisis that paved the way for the 1970 military coup that brought Amin to power. Amin destroyed the country demographically (over three hundred thousand dead), professionally, economically and socially hoping that he would silence dissent and rule for life. He even invaded a neighboring country to consolidate support at home. Amin’s atrocities resulted in a war with Tanzania and Uganda rebels that left many parts of the country devastated.

The 1980 general elections were won by Uganda Peoples’ Congress (UPC) led by Obote and certified legitimate by international observers (based on ‘prevailing circumstances’). The verdict was rejected by opposition parties. A few groups unhappy with the democratic process took to the bush and waged a very destructive five-year guerrilla war forcing a section of the national army to topple the government in July 1985 which was six months later removed from power by guerrillas led by Museveni.

Why I have clashed with Museveni

Some people –Ugandans and non-Ugandans – close and not so close to me have wondered – directly and indirectly – why I have decided to oppose Museveni when there is no chance of winning because he is powerful at home and abroad. Besides I or someone else could get hurt. Some have even questioned my motive.

This is the first time in Uganda’s political history that I have actively campaigned. I have chosen to participate in order to defeat Museveni in his re-election bid for another five years. He has been president for 25 years already. During this period, as outlined below, the welfare of the majority of Uganda citizens and the environment has deteriorated.

My education and profession were influenced greatly by the injustices of the colonial indirect rule system which was an extension of a repressive feudal system of lords and serfs (rich and poor) in Rujumbura county of Rukungiri district in southwest Uganda. The chiefs and their families lived very well at the expense of the poor who produced goods and services. Through tribute, taxes and free labor the poor peasants toiled for the comfort of the chiefs. Most of the nutritious food (goat meat, chicken, eggs, beans, fruits etc) was consumed by chiefs. Heads of households would disappear for months to work for tax money leaving their wives behind toiling to keep the family alive.

Museveni has violent and feudal characteristics

The people of Uganda are resenting Museveni because of his increasing use of violence which he studied in Tanzania and has been encouraged to apply at home by some donors to maintain ‘stability’; his implementation of the philosophy of metamorphosis designed to transform beyond recognition Uganda’s ecological and demographic landscape (having more cattle than crops and more foreigners than indigenous people and another Ivory Coast in Uganda); and his consolidation of feudalism of lords (Bahororo) and serfs (the rest of Uganda) and Tutsi empire disguised as East African political federation with western encouragement.

Through the application of harsh anti-sectarian and anti-terrorism Acts and with tacit donor support, Museveni has violently silenced dissent apparently in the name of political and economic stability. Meanwhile suppressed dissent built into frustration and anger and then into enlightenment and dialectics. Ugandans thus no longer regard Museveni as a leader with divine right whose word is taken at face value. Instead, Ugandans are asking questions and demanding satisfactory answers (enlightenment) and are spending more time in archives and libraries and on the internet unearthing what was hidden (dialectics). Supporters of Museveni at home and abroad should not be surprised at what has hit them.

Comparison between Museveni and British colonial chiefs in Uganda

The comments and questions I am receiving from readers of my books and blog have rekindled hope that Uganda might exit from the current neo-colonial, private sector dominated and market oriented model to a truly poverty-reduction paradigm based on building viable and lasting institutions and infrastructure (rather than governments and individual leaders) and promoting public and private partnership. But for this to happen, leaders in Uganda must have a different political economy profile from those in power today.

Museveni has failed the people of Uganda and pleased his western sponsors because he has had two conflictingstrategies. On the one hand, he has told Ugandans the right things such as transformation of Uganda’s economy through industrialization and improving the living standards of all Ugandans etc. On the other hand, he has in practice implemented what western powers have demanded – integrating Uganda into a global market economy embodied in the Washington Consensus (WC) similar to what Britain demanded during the colonial period. The WC model requires Uganda leadership to adopt policies and strategies similar to those in the colonial days under the indirect rule system. In essence Museveni has behaved like an indirect rule chief under the direction of western powers including the World Bank, IMF and especially Britain. Let us review a few examples to show that Museveni has served western and not Ugandan interests.

Museveni’s use of force has become counterproductive

There is consensus that Museveni is a leader guided by a unique philosophy based on the use of force and fear, dependence on foreigners and regional focus that has made his presidency counter-productive, calling for his defeat in 2011 elections. Museveni’s defeat is very important for Uganda, neighboring countries and development partners in order to avoid heavier losses in the future. Thick clouds are gathering on the political horizon and if they are not dissipated quickly they could unleash a very destructive storm. If preventive steps had been taken Ethiopia and Zaire could have avoided the adverse impact of 1974 and 1996/7 events respectively. To prevent the possibility of such events occurring in Uganda, we need to adopt a preventive strategy because it is always cheaper than cure. We should at all times avoid emotions about what Museveni has done for or against us. We should be guided only by considerations of dignity, liberty/freedom and equality of all Ugandans. We should seek and tell the truth because a diversion will be catastrophic. For easy reference let us review the rationale behind Museveni’s philosophy.

Museveni must be accountable for his government failures

Museveni behaves as though he does not understand the concept of accountability even though he grew up in an environment where accountability is very well understood. For example, in western Uganda culture – where Museveni comes from – when your cows destroy a neighbor’s garden when your son was tending them, it is the father who is accountable and pays the fine. Similarly when Museveni’s employees (national or foreign) make mistakes he should be accountable and accept the consequences. Instead Museveni blames others. But before coming to cases where Museveni and those who support him have blamed others, let us examine briefly why Museveni has done poorly with a view to drawing lessons for future leaders and whoever forms the next government after February 18, 2011 elections.

1. Museveni’s school performance through undergraduate studies was not bright. This can be deduced from his own writings and reports (subject to confirmation) that he obtained a pass at the university of Dar es Salaam. At that time a pass was like a certificate of attendance. He did not pursue graduate studies that introduce students to analytical tools and research methodology. So he has a deficit at the academic level. And he became president when the world economy had shifted from Keynesian to neoliberal ideology known as the Washington Consensus that requires a lot of adjustment from state to market forces and laissez-faire capitalism.

Museveni has begun metamorphosing Uganda into a new landscape

If we Ugandans do not put our act together quickly, we are going to lose Uganda as we have known it. Museveni who began preparations as early as 1965 (Bahororo failure to get a separate district in Ankole at independence and political ascendancy of Bairu in Ankole disturbed him) came to power with a clear mission known to himself and his inner core of Bahororo people – (1) the ascendancy of Bahororo in Uganda’s political economy and great lakes region (Tutsi Empire), and (2) metamorphosis of Uganda into a new landscape.

Museveni was also aware that these transformations would take a long time to be realized. That is why he initially asked for a fifteen year mandate which has turned out to be inadequate. During an interview on New Year’s Day (2011), Museveni declined to indicate when he would quit Uganda’s political stage. The impression he gave left no doubt that he is still around for a while possibly by force should Ugandans refuse to re-elect him. What he has not admitted is that he thought (wrongly) that he would quickly trample on Ugandans through wars and impoverishment and reduce them to insignificant vulnerable minority and transform Uganda into a new landscape ecologically, economically, demographically and politically without difficulty. Ugandans have turned out to be resilient in the face of wars, pandemics, epidemics and impoverishment and are still kicking with considerable force that cannot be ignored.

Why has Museveni’s birth place issue resurfaced?

Without realizing it, Uganda has entered two somewhat related phases: the enlightenment phase and the dialectics phase. The enlightenment phase involves reasoning: asking questions and demanding convincing answers. The dialectics phase means that Ugandans are scrutinizing Museveni statements like never before to demonstrate that the truth of his intentions is in that he does not say. In other words, Ugandans are trying to make the absent the present because the greater part of the truth is in that which is absent.

Based on his actions during and since the guerrilla war a rapidly increasing number of Ugandans have concluded that Museveni is a foreigner whose intentions are to marginalize indigenous Ugandans economically, demographically and politically working in close cooperation with foreigners especially Britain, Uganda’s neocolonial master.

The following harsh actions (some of them repeated for easy reference) taken by Museveni are used as illustrations that only a foreigner can impose on a people he does not belong to.

Why is Museveni popular in Britain?

A former African head of state remarked that when an African leader is popular with and praised sky high by Europeans it means that by and large that leader is taking care of European interests more than those of his/her citizens.

Apart from areas of white settlement, Britain (unlike Portugal) chose to give independence to African countries without much struggle in order to keep them colonized and continue to serve British interests. It did so by influencing the choice of leaders or governing political parties. If a chosen leader digressed, he would be removed and replaced by a more compliant one.

In Uganda UPC/KY coalition and the rise to power of Obote were supported by Britain. When relations between Obote and Britain got strained Obote was removed and replaced by Amin, a gentle giant easy to do business with (Jon Abbink and Gerti Hesseling 2000 and New Africa February 2001).

As we have detailed elsewhere and posted on www.kashambuzi.com, Museveni was chosen by western powers including Britain in the early 1980s to topple Obote and UPC government (actually toppled by Okello in July 1985) because Obote was not trusted to do business with (Peter Phillips 2006 and Vijay Gupta 1983). Obote was chased out twice in 1971 and 1985 because by and large he put Uganda interests above Europeans! Amin was supported until Tanzania troops and Uganda exiles chased him out of the country in 1979.

Museveni came to power by default, has stayed by hiding vital information

By and large a decision taken when one is angry, frustrated, tired or in a hurry is likely to be wrong. In 1981, Baganda and Catholics (no offense) with backing of some western powers led by Britain decided to wage a guerrilla war because they were angry, frustrated, tired and in a hurry that Obote had returned to power. Without proper scrutiny of each other, two ideologically opposed groups: Popular Resistance Army (PRA) and Uganda Freedom Fighters (UFF) formed the National Resistance Movement (NRM) with Yusuf Lule (RIP) as chairman and Museveni as vice chairman and also chairman of the high command of its armed wing, the National Resistance Army (NRA). This became a clear case of enemy’s enemy is a friend. What was common between the two groups is that they were both enemies (opponents to use a milder word) of Obote and UPC. What both wanted was to remove Obote and sort out their differences later, if any.