NRM has nowhere else to go but negotiate reforms

The National Resistance Movement (NRM) thought that it had created a favorable permanent situation and developed immunity against challenge after 1987 when it signed a stabilization and structural adjustment program (SAP) with the IMF, started to enjoy rapid economic growth (in large part because of excess capacity inherited in 1986 now almost exhausted) and established macroeconomic stability by keeping inflation in single digits through raising interest rates, balanced the budget by removing subsidies and dismissing public servants, accumulated foreign currency reserves in the central bank to guarantee continued imports for the rich and received massive external support.

NRM speeches were full of confidence and vibrancy stressing that market forces, laissez faire and trickledown would solve all problems. All NRM needed to do was to make sure that opposition was not allowed to say anything negative. The military, police, intelligence and prisons were expanded to deal with dissent. Lack of demonstrations was interpreted by the outside world as a sign of stability. Invitations to make speeches about Uganda’s success story at UN and G8 summits blinded NRM government to creeping signs of exhaustion and possible failure. Museveni even declared that there was no problem he could not solve.

Uganda’s main challenge

Greetings fellow Ugandans and friends

Making progress in any area of human endeavor begins with a clear understanding of the challenge and how to address it.

1. Uganda’s principal problem right now is Museveni and his political economy philosophy for Uganda and the great lakes region. It has potential for instability that will adversely affect domestic and foreign investments in the region. Bwengye said in an interview in 2005 that Museveni was given a key role in the guerrilla struggle without understanding who he was and what he exactly stood for.

2. As we know Museveni became president in 1986 without legitimacy. He was acting Chairman of NRM after the passing of Yusuf Lule. Elections to replace Lule were delayed until NRM/NRA entered Kampala and Museveni who had been acting NRM chairman became president by default. So he had no legitimacy but nobody raised it.

3. Now that we know who he is we are not going to allow him to govern without legitimacy again. That is why the current negotiations being moderated by religious leaders should not lead us into a government of national unity headed by Museveni because that will legitimize his illegitimate government of, by and for foreigners. Museveni and NRM candidates were voted overwhelmingly by foreigners who were bused in from Burundi, Rwanda, Tanzania and DRC as well as migrants and refugees.

Bahororo women are destroying Bairu nation

Readers who are not used to this kind of exchange might be disturbed. However, if you have an open mind you will overcome it once you understand the tricks Bahororo are using to keep Bairu down and by extension the rest of Uganda. I know there are some Bairu who will object to this kind of conversation in large part because they are benefiting from Museveni regime and do not want trouble.

The primary objective of writing this and other stories is not to make friends (it will be good if that happens) but to share my research findings with a wider public. I have tried to be as factual and as balanced as possible because I know that any story about the relationship between Bahororo and Bairu is bound to be controversial and emotional. If you do not agree challenge me with facts and not emotions. We are not going to let a whole nation be destroyed because we do not want to upset a few people.

Museveni’s end of 2009 address suffers from obscurantism

During his first inaugural address in 1986, Yoweri Museveni denounced the philosophy of obscurantism, a situation where ideas are deliberately obscured. Because NRM and its leadership were not interested in the politics of obscurantism, they, like good doctors, would diagnose correctly the ills of Ugandan society before announcing corrective measures. He touched on Uganda’s core development challenge when he condemned Uganda leaders who travel in executive jets while 90 percent of Ugandans have no shoes.

After a careful and comprehensive analysis, NRM recommended solutions to Uganda’s economic and social ills in a ten-point program in which, inter alia, production for domestic and external markets would be balanced and Uganda would be metamorphosed into an integrated, self-sustaining and independent economy.

On January 26, 1990, President Museveni announced a major economic policy shift that abandoned the popular ten-point program in favor of the Washington Consensus based on market forces and laissez-faire capitalism. He embraced export-led growth that diversified into non-traditional exports mostly of foodstuffs traditionally grown for domestic consumption.

The president and his government did not tell the nation that the shift was dictated by donors as a condition for financial and technical assistance. The government opened the country to all stakeholders with new ideas knowing full well that many of them were experimental and may undermine Uganda’s development prospects.