NRM has nowhere else to go but negotiate reforms

The National Resistance Movement (NRM) thought that it had created a favorable permanent situation and developed immunity against challenge after 1987 when it signed a stabilization and structural adjustment program (SAP) with the IMF, started to enjoy rapid economic growth (in large part because of excess capacity inherited in 1986 now almost exhausted) and established macroeconomic stability by keeping inflation in single digits through raising interest rates, balanced the budget by removing subsidies and dismissing public servants, accumulated foreign currency reserves in the central bank to guarantee continued imports for the rich and received massive external support.

NRM speeches were full of confidence and vibrancy stressing that market forces, laissez faire and trickledown would solve all problems. All NRM needed to do was to make sure that opposition was not allowed to say anything negative. The military, police, intelligence and prisons were expanded to deal with dissent. Lack of demonstrations was interpreted by the outside world as a sign of stability. Invitations to make speeches about Uganda’s success story at UN and G8 summits blinded NRM government to creeping signs of exhaustion and possible failure. Museveni even declared that there was no problem he could not solve.

Naturally, complacency set in and genuine advice that conditions in Uganda were not as rosy as presented was rejected as the work of opposition parties frustrated by NRM success. Annual state of the republic and budget speeches focused on economic growth, low inflation, export diversification, private sector and national security, leaving out almost entirely human security – jobs, food, shelter, clothing, education, health and the environment. Many development partners that were trying out their theories said nothing even when they knew Uganda pillars of support were yielding to pressure for change.

The bad news could no longer be kept from public view. The impact of poverty began to show. Uganda and the world watched and read about Ugandans dying of malnutrition especially children and the elderly. Jiggers disfigured Ugandans especially in Busoga because of poor housing and lack of shoes. The images were so disturbing that appeals were made that they should be taken off TV screens. Youth unemployment went beyond 80 percent. Desperate people began to drink excessively making Uganda number one in the world in per capita alcohol consumption. Road accidents increased because of drunkenness and the poor state of roads. Human trafficking and sacrifice, insanity, moral decomposition and breakdown in community cohesion, not economic growth and per capita income or inflation control and export diversification, increasingly came to define Uganda’s state of being.

People who had supported and described Museveni as the intellectual, the bold, the star pupil and darling of the west and dean of a new breed of African leaders began to distance themselves. Then demonstrations followed at home and abroad. Museveni’s automatic invitations to world summits dried up. Museveni began to skip meetings including those at the UN.

Then came 2011 elections. Fearing overwhelming defeat, Museveni (is NRM and government) refused to set up an independent electoral commission. He disenfranchised millions of Uganda voters he thought were not on his side. He allowed foreigners to vote for him. Public money was stolen from the treasury and central bank to buy voters. The military was deployed massively and intimidated many opposition voters who stayed in their homes. Museveni had thought the defeated opposition candidates would go to the High Court which as in the past would declare him the winner. They did not and have not conceded defeat. Museveni went ahead and formed an illegitimate government. On Museveni’s inauguration day in May 2011 more Ugandans chose to go to the airport to welcome Besigye home than witness Museveni being sworn in. The message of what lay in store was very clear. Instead of focusing on domestic economic and social investment, Museveni squandered resources campaigning for seats at the Security Council at the UN and AU and Human Rights Council and hosting expensive summits including Commonwealth, AU and ICC. Meanwhile the domestic situation deteriorated.

Demonstrations followed and were met with disproportionate security force resulting in death, massive arrests and detention, provoking condemnation including by former staunch allies. Donor money declined and management of many donor-funded projects went to NGOs and not central government. Museveni and his security forces were warned that ICC was watching and would not hesitate to take appropriate.

Museveni now has no money to pay public servants and bribe key supporters. Donations he once took for granted have declined. When he tried to raise revenue through more taxes, Ugandans rebelled and went on strike. Members of parliament including those from Museveni’s own party began to restrain arbitrary use of executive power. Frequent reshuffles of senior staff in the military and police are being interpreted as a sign of potential instability.

Added together one can safely conclude that Museveni has been pushed against the wall. He can only be saved by an ineffective and divided opposition and it is in Museveni’s interest to keep the opposition divided. All opposition parties and groups must get together under capable leadership with clean record and impeccable character and knowledge to demand reforms that will create a level playing field for all to compete. The ball is no longer in Museveni’s court but somewhere waiting for the opposition to pick it up. The opposition groups need a Mandela to bring them together and lead them to victory.

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