How Museveni has used the West to pursue the Tutsi Empire dream

Museveni’s life and energies at least since the early 1960s have been devoted to resurrecting Mpororo kingdom and expanding it into a Tutsi Empire initially in the Great Lakes region of Africa, explaining in large part why Ankole kingdom was not restored as it would interfere with Bahororo/Tutsi Empire project. Although they lost territory when Mpororo kingdom disintegrated around 1750, Bahororo (Batutsi people of Mpororo kingdom) wherever they went including back to Rwanda (it is believed Kagame like Museveni is a Muhororo subject to confirmation, perhaps explaining why Rwanda kingdom was not restored) tenaciously clung together (Karugire 1980) by resisting intermarriage with other ethnic groups hoping that someday their Mpororo kingdom would be resurrected.

In preparation for Uganda’s independence, Bahororo in Ankole demanded a separate district but Bahima rejected the idea. Museveni was old enough to witness the mistreatment of Bahororo by Bahima. At the same time Batutsi of Rwanda including Bahororo suffered a double defeat through the social revolution of 1959 and pre-independence elections leading to independence in 1962.

It is believed (subject to confirmation) that Batutsi who sought refuge in Uganda were actually Bahororo whose ancestors had returned to Rwanda when Mpororo kingdom disintegrated. They believed they would be welcomed and accommodated by their kin and kith in Ankole and Kigezi and escape the inconveniences and stigma associated with refugee camps. And Kangaho then a member of LEGCO from Ankole insisted over objections of others that Ankole had enough space to accommodate Tutsi refugees and their cattle. Eventually some one third of the refugees and their cattle got absorbed in Ankole and Kigezi families raising population densities beyond the carrying capacity.

The rest were allowed to move and settle wherever there was pasture. This trek took them from “the new districts of Ntungamo, Mbarara, Bushenyi, Rakai, Masaka, Mubende, Luwero and even beyond the Nile River to Apac, Lira, Kitgum, Soroti and Kumi” (Dixon Kamukama 1997). British authorities permitted this mobility (to avoid problems connected with refugee camps) because they were speeding up independence for Uganda to escape political problems that were being experienced in Kenya, Sudan, Congo, Rwanda and Burundi.

Museveni and Bahororo fellow students and Rwanda refugees at Ntare School formed an association in the early 1960s presumably for restoration of Tutsi dominance over Bantu (Bairu and Bahutu) in the Great Lakes region, explaining in part why Museveni developed an early interest in East African economic integration and political federation and even unfairly blamed Obote for lack of interest in the subject.

Museveni knew that Bahororo didn’t have the numbers to realize Tutsi dream through elections. He opted for the military solution. He also knew that he would need external backing, either from Africa or beyond or both. He began to work along these lines from the middle of the 1960s. He and Rwigyema (RIP) were among the first to go for military training. Later he identified members of his group to pursue diplomatic networking and obtain western and African support. New York, London and Lusaka were among the capitals they operated from.

The 1980s characterized by Cold War confrontation and structural adjustment as well as the controversial 1980 elections in Uganda and later the 1994 Rwanda genocide gave Museveni a golden opportunity to pursue his Tutsi Empire dream without many noticing. The election of UPC and Obote in 1980 was not well received in western circles and other countries with interest in northern and central African geopolitics. Obote was seen as socialist and not suitable for Great Lakes and Middle East geopolitics. Obote also ran into disagreement with IMF over budget policy as part of structural adjustment conditionality and the World Bank over human rights violations and both withdrew support (Uganda Country Profile 1992-93. The Economist Intelligence Unit, and G. W. Kanyeihamba 2002). Museveni was identified as an alternative for support and eventual replacement of Obote and would in turn help in Great Lakes geopolitical conflicts (Peter Phillips 2007). Museveni’s five-year guerrilla war was thus facilitated with substantial financial, media and diplomatic assistance (EIR November 1994).

In 1986 Museveni captured power, became president and launched the popular mixed economy ten-point program. In 1987, under pressure from western countries and institutions (New African 1987-88), Museveni unceremoniously dropped the program and launched the unpopular “shock therapy” version of structural adjustment program (SAP), dismissed from the ministry of finance and central bank officials who wanted a gradual and sequenced approach to minimize social costs.

As reward for western support during the guerrilla war, Museveni invited all expelled Asians to return to Uganda and repossess their properties over strong objection among Ugandans even NRM cadres who thought they didn’t fight to bring back Asians (ironically Museveni refused return of Ugandans in the diaspora (The Courier 1993). Museveni also agreed to stick religiously to IMF and World Bank conditionality in stabilization and structural adjustment program in return for their solid support. These developments served the west and Museveni interests very well. IMF and World Bank controlled the design and implementation of Uganda’s economic recovery program (P. Langseth et al., 1995).

While IMF and World Bank implemented their program without interruption, Museveni used SAP to impoverish, weaken, marginalize and render Ugandans economically and politically voiceless and powerless. With zeal, Museveni retrenched public servants he didn’t like either because they worked for Obote or belonged to ethnic groups he wanted to marginalize. He abolished subsidies on education, healthcare and agriculture. He eliminated some schools and downgraded others in targeted areas. He introduced school fees and health charges which ordinary people could not afford. He abolished cooperatives and diminished extension services. He diversified exports with foodstuffs like beans, corn/maize and fish that traditionally were produced for domestic consumption. He refused to support lunch for vulnerable primary school children who dropped out of school in large numbers. He insisted the private sector was responsible for creating jobs and setting wages and working conditions and trickledown economics for distributing the benefits of economic growth among classes and regions.

Museveni was also allowed to build strong security forces especially the military and intelligence under the pretext he needed them to prevent demonstrations and riots against structural adjustment. Democracy was delayed for similar reasons as it would interfere with implementation of the program. He was permitted to delay elections for ten years and multi-party elections even longer, all of them rigged while the west watched to keep Museveni in power. One powerful western commentator and strong supporter of Museveni observed “You need a dictator like Museveni to push these types of policies [stabilization and structural adjustment]”(EIR September 19, 1997). Sadly, the policies failed miserably and were abandoned in 2009 having wreaked social, moral and environmental havoc.

Not surprisingly, the West turned the other way when Museveni removed presidential term limits from the 1995 constitution, refused to establish an independent electoral commission and massively abused Ugandan human rights and freedoms with impunity. In 2011 elections, Museveni emptied the treasury to run the campaign without donors protesting even after the minister of finance declared that the treasury was empty. Instead of condemning Museveni for this wrongdoing, he was congratulated for his re-election even when the Commonwealth Observer Mission protested that the electoral process lacked a level playing field and presidential opposition candidates refused to concede defeat, conditions for declaring the election results null and void. Corruption and sectarianism were allowed to fester with Batutsi or those connected with them in charge of the military and police, the economy and public service.

Museveni received more military advisers and training of the armed forces apparently to prevent terrorism from finding a home in Uganda and other parts of the region. Museveni engaged in regional wars and intervention in internal affairs from Sudan to DRC. Museveni assisted Kagame and RPF to capture power in tragic genocide conditions which were used to blame Bahutu as bad guys and treat Batutsi as victims that needed international sympathy and support. Museveni sent troops in peace keeping operations largely to win western gratitude but mostly to give his soldiers combat experience unmatched in the Great Lakes region to enable him implement his Tutsi Empire dream unrestrained.

Using international guilt over Rwanda genocide and overwhelming sympathy for Tutsi victims and exploiting geopolitical conflicts in the Great Lakes region, Museveni and Kagame have taken full advantage to disproportionately advance the interests of Batutsi in the region as an integral part of building a Tutsi empire. Other members of the East African community acquiesced when Museveni decided he wanted political federation to be fast tracked over economic integration so that federation is achieved while he is still president and he becomes the first federation president by virtue of his seniority. Anticipating federation may not be ready before 2016, Museveni has started campaigning for 2016 presidential elections.

It is reported that Kagame recently announced after a meeting between Rwanda and Uganda delegations that national borders in East Africa should be eliminated because they were drawn by colonizers of Africa and independent states are not obliged to keep them.

To protect Museveni western powers have focused evaluation on security in the Great Lakes region and participation in peacekeeping operations. Regarding the economy focus has been on economic growth and per capita income, controlling inflation, privatizing and liberalizing the economy and diversifying exports. They have ignored skewed income distribution, rising poverty and unemployment, collapsing education, healthcare and environmental systems as well as rampant corruption, sectarianism, cronyism and mismanagement of public funds and abuse of human rights and fundamental freedoms. Museveni has also been tolerated to reappoint dismissed and censured ministers for corruption, divide up the country into tribal-like and economically unviable entities called districts and appoint some 70 ministers that consume a large chunk of development funds.

Confident that he had suffocated Ugandans to the point of no resistance to his dictatorship and assured of solid western support for serving them well, Museveni finally declared his mission on April 4, 1997. “My mission is to see that Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire [DRC] become federal states under one nation”(EIR Special Report 1997). Why he left out Somalia remains unclear.

As part of the final phase towards realization of Tutsi Empire, Kagame and Museveni have agreed to eliminate state borders within the East African Community possibly beginning with the border between Rwanda and Uganda which could happen anytime from now if Ugandans, East African community, African Union and the rest of the world does not object and condemn the decision.

Until recently, Museveni was garlanded as the dean of the breed of African leaders and his championship in efforts to bring stability in the Great Lakes region from Sudan to Burundi to Rwanda to DRC (In fact Museveni and Kagame have planted seeds of instability in their efforts to make Batutsi a dominant power over other ethnic groups that are far superior numerically – and now educated, well travelled and know their rights and freedoms – over Batutsi in the region). He was christened the darling of the West and invited regularly to attend Summits of G8. Uganda was regarded as an economic success story to be emulated by other developing countries. With collapse of SAP and rising opposition against NRM regime, former supporters are recasting their approach to Uganda.

Thankfully, the tide has turned and the West is seeing Uganda through different lenses. It is possible that through improved democracy and governance underpinned by creation of an independent electoral commission, restoration of term limits, standardization of campaign finance and fight against corruption, sectarianism, cronyism and mismanagement of public finance, Uganda could soon be counted among countries on the way to realizing true democracy in which the people elect their representatives and hold them accountable for commissions and omissions. These measures will likely put an end to the pursuit of a reckless dream of a Tutsi Empire in Middle Africa.

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