Economic Performance under Obote Governments

The economic record under Obote one and two regimes has been
controversial. There are those who report a very poor performance and those who
disagree. In this article, we present the contrasting views leaving the readers
to draw their own conclusions. 

Justice George Kanyeihamba writes that “At independence, the
Ugandan economy was in excellent form. It was one of the strongest in black
Africa. Comparative world economic data of the period excluded Uganda from the
poorest countries of the world. By the time of the first Obote government came
to be overthrown by the army in 1971, the economy was not in good shape and bad
economic performance was one of the reasons given by the Uganda soldiers for
overthrowing the UPC government from power. By the time Obote violated the
Independence Constitution, declared himself President, dismantled the
traditional infrastructure, suppressed the electoral process and established an
authoritarian presidency, the Uganda economy was weaker still…

  “A number of Western governments got committed to supporting
the Obote II government regardless of its bad record on the Humanitarian Rights
situation. The financial loans and gifts donated by these governments were
supplemented, sustained and spearheaded by the World Bank and the IMF. In a bid
to win international recognition and the badly needed foreign exchange, the
Obote II government accepted all the conditionalities imposed by the donor
countries and by the World Bank and the IMF. A study commissioned at the time
in Sweden revealed that much of the money given to Uganda did not benefit the
common people…

“The scale of corruption in the country was such that many
Ugandan leaders and public officials siphoned off part of it for private personal
use. On the other hand, the abject poverty of the ordinary man and woman was
unbearable…

“Unfortunately for the country, much of these funds had
either been wasted on the internal wars and conflicts or diverted to personal
use…

“Obote did not arouse the same international revulsion as Idi
Amin because of a mistaken belief in the international community that no one
could do worse than Amin. Obote was also shielded by diplomats and
representatives of the countries of the West and the World Bank and IMF who had
invested heavily in the recovery of Uganda from the ravages of Idi Amin…

 

“The World Bank and the IMF which had selected the Uganda of
Obote to be assisted and developed as a model country for the Third World, were
embarrassed at an International conference they had organized and financed in
Copenhagen, Denmark, to appraise the work and progress made in Uganda. The
embarrassment came about when several Ugandans who had been invited to attend
were led by Dr. G. W. Kanyeihamba and Mr. Sempebwa…in turning the meeting
into a critique of the Obote regime…. The World Bank was represented at that
conference by Mrs. Katrine Saito. After listening to the address of Kanyeihamba
and of the other Ugandans who were critical, she was visibly shocked to learn
about the killings and other gross violations of human rights in Uganda by a
government supported as a model by the Bank. She spent the rest of the
conference interviewing Kanyeihamba, Sempebwa, and several other participants
who were critical of the Obote government and supportive of Museveni and the
NRM.
  On her return to Washington, Mrs.
Saito was among the World Bank officials who persuaded the Bank to abandon
Obote in favor of Museveni and the NRM. Following the successes of the NRM and
its assumption of power, Mrs. Saito was amongst the very first World civil
servants to visit and work in the Uganda of Museveni and the NRM” (Kanyeihamba.
2002).

 

In contrast, the World Bank records that “Uganda had one of
the most promising economies in Sub-Saharan Africa at the beginning of the
1960s… GDP growth was about 6 percent a year from 1963 to 1970, and relative
price stability was maintained. At independence in 1962 Uganda had one of the
most vigorous and promising economies in Sub-Saharan Africa, and the years
following independence amply demonstrated its economic potential. Uganda’s
social indicators were comparable to, if not better than, most countries in
Africa. The country’s health services had developed into one of Africa’s best.
Uganda pioneered many low-cost health and nutrition programs. There was a
highly organized network of vaccination centers and immunization programs
reached 70 percent of the population. Although school enrollment was still low,
Uganda’s education system had developed a reputation for very high quality” (World
Bank 1999).

 

Eric Kashambuzi (2001) reports that, “In Uganda which
attained independence in October 1962, the government embarked on comprehensive
medical programs, including physical and human capacity building. From 1966 to
1970, 20 new rural hospitals were constructed compared to a total of 26
hospitals during the entire colonial period from 1900 to 1962 (F. Banugire,
undated). Medical doctors, nurses, midwives and others were trained in the
country and abroad. Water supply was provided by constructing wells and
hand-pumped boreholes. Water tanks were also provided to harvest and store rain
water. Immunization programs received high priority. By 1970, the country had
achieved a 70 percent child immunization rate, as well as a broad-based
health-care network even in the rural areas (FAO 1998).
 As Banugire notes, implementation of the
health program was among the greatest success stories during the second plan
period from 1966 to 1971 (Banugire. undated). Consequently, between 1959 and
1969, infant mortality declined from 160 to 120 per 1000 live births (Uganda
Human Development Report. 1996)”

 

Henry Kyemba (1977) reports that “There was a good foundation
of forty-eight government hospitals, one hundred and fifty health centers
(small units with about thirty beds each) and three hundred dispensaries. The
government hospitals were administered in British fashion. Treatment was free.
… The mission hospitals levied a small charge; the government defrayed the
running costs. At the time of the coup [1971], these institutions were staffed
by experienced teams of doctors, nurses and paramedical staff. Salaries were
low …by Western standards… But until 1971 – when Uganda first began to feel the
effects of galloping inflation – these salaries had been adequate enough”.

 

Hon. C. W. C. B. Kiyonga reports that “It is to be
acknowledged, however, that the neo-colonial economy of Uganda was doing well
up to the early 1970s. The country had a diversified export base and earned
substantial foreign currency to meet its needs. The industrial sector produced
a wide range of consumer goods to satisfy local demands and a little surplus
was exported to the neighboring countries. The civil service then was well
formed and had the capability to implement programs. There was an enterprising
Asian and African Middle Class which ran the private sector effectively. Indeed
the economy was growing at a rate of 5 percent per annum. The second point to
register thus far is that the appendage economy was at one time buoyant”
(Papers presented at the Uganda Government Seminar on the Economy Since 1986. June
1990).

 

The Uganda Peoples Congress (UPC) reported in its 1980
Manifesto that “Uganda’s economic growth between 1965 [and] 1970 averaged 7.8
percent which was the highest in East Africa. Our overall balance of trade
position was also the highest in the region. Agriculture was the main
contributor to that growth and health balance of trade” (UPC. 1980).

 

Kenneth Ingham reports that “…the Sunday Times [of London]
carried a report commending Obote’s achievements on the economic front. For the
first time in three turbulent years following Idi Amin’s overthrow, it stated,
Uganda looked like a country with a chance to rise from the ruins. Obote, it
said, had achieved a near-miracle of stabilization. Consumer prices had fallen
in the previous twelve months; exports were rising, and government revenue was
rising faster than its spending. Already half the finance needed to launch 140
key projects aimed at boosting agriculture and industry had been raised, and
Obote had despatched a team of senior people to London to try to encourage
foreign investors to provide the rest of the money by offering them a range of
incentives such as exemption from import duties and the freedom to repatriate
profits….

“In spite of these successes, the political scene remained
clouded by the continuation of terrorism” (Kenneth Ingham. 1994).

 

“Uganda ran into problems with the IMF over the sharp
rise in public spending and the government’s worries over the plummeting
exchange rate. It [government] was not able to renegotiate a new facility [with
the IMF] when the one of September 1984 expired with SDR [Special Drawing
Rights] 30m [million] still undrawn. Obote ruled out a further standby facility
because he would have to comply with unpopular economic measures in the run up
to the impending elections” (New African Yearbook, 1987-88).

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