Ugandans, development partners and friends must understand fully that Museveni’s goal – and one goal only – is to impose Bahororo hegemony over the people of Uganda through democracy at gun point. Democracy is needed for international recognition of his goal otherwise Museveni would simply use force and impose it. If Museveni is re-elected (I have advocated vigorously that he should be defeated to avoid troubles ahead), he will use the next five years (because time is not on his side) to force a conclusion of his project or lay a solid foundation for his handpicked successor to complete it. His push may provoke resistance that could result in a political and /or military confrontation and possible explosion. To prevent this from happening, we need to disaggregate the components of his power base and understand when, where, why and how his journey began. This is a tough and dangerous job but someone has to do it. I will do it for the future of all Uganda children. Those who have described me as a divider and advised Ugandans to ignore what I am saying are trying to divert your attention from Museveni’s plan for Bahororo hegemony. Bahororo (Batutsi from Rwanda) are people (whose base is in Ntungamo and Rukungiri/Rujumbura in southwest Uganda) that were represented at a meeting Museveni convened at his home in Rwakitura on March 15, 1992. The meeting was convened to agree on a road map for Bahororo hegemony. The report of that meeting and participants has been widely circulated.
Museveni’s political and military journey began around 1960. Two events triggered the process. First, during negotiations for independence, Bahororo in Ankole demanded a separate Mpororo district. Bahima refused and Museveni took note of that outcome (some people think Museveni has refused restoration of Bahima’s Ankole kingdom in retaliation). Second, the political ascendancy of Bairu in Ankole who had been treated like slaves serving Bahima and Bahororo interests upset Museveni.
From then on, Museveni began to trace Bahororo wherever they live mostly in Uganda and Rwanda (some Bahororo returned to Rwanda when Mpororo kingdom collapsed) in order to restore their glory and stop political ascendancy of Bairu. As Karugire (1980) advised, Bahororo have clung tenaciously together in large part by refusing to marry women from other ethnic groups except their own Nilotic one.
After he obtained some numbers, Museveni realized thatBahororo are numerically insignificant to make democratic changes in their favor. Museveni then approached Bahima for support (although Bahima and Bahororo have had major differences going as far back as Kahaya, Mbaguta and Igumira days at the time Nkore was being colonized). Museveni convinced Bahima that if Bahororo and Bahima do not work together as cousins (they share the same Nilotic Luo-speaking ancestry from Bahr el Gazal in southern Sudan), both groups would be drowned by the rising political tide of Bairu their former ‘slaves’. Bahima were convinced and rallied behind Museveni.
Museveni then turned to Catholic Bairu in Ankole. He reminded them that alone Catholic Bairu will never defeat Protestant Bairu politically unless they worked with Bahima and Bahororo their former masters. In order to gain political ascendancy over Protestant Bairu, Catholic Bairu agreed to rally behind Bahororo and Bahima that treated them like slaves in pre and colonial days. That is why in Ankole politics has divided Bairu along religious lines and weakened them badly to this day in 2010. It is sad that numerically significant Bairu have been badly divided as each group undermines the other to get Museveni’s recognition, a struggle that Museveni has used to maximum effect to weaken them even further. Bairu – you need to reexamine your politics or you are going to get finished at this rate. This is not sectarianism. It is genuine advice for the future of the children.
Thus, Museveni emerged from Ankole with support of Bahima and Catholic Bairu. Before heading for Dar in Tanzania for undergraduate studies, Museveni had concluded that his political strategy must be combined with a military one for maximum effect.
While at Dar es Salaam, he did three things besides studying to advance his ambition. He underwent military training and mobilized support from southern African liberation movements that eventually gained independence; read revolutionary books; and campaigned among Uganda students to win Catholic support by reminding them that they had been cheated by Protestants in 1962 elections. He urged them to join him to defeat Obote I and his Protestant government. He then turned to Baganda (Protestants, Catholics and Muslims) and reminded them that Obote had made them lose the referendum on the ‘lost county’ contest. He later added the lost Buganda kingdom to the list of Baganda grievances. He asked them to join him to defeat Obote.
During Amin’s regime, Museveni continued his military and political activities. Along the way, Museveni realized he would need external support outside Africa. He began to work on that as well. Equipped with these preparations Museveni headed for the Moshi conference in 1979 hoping to gain national recognition. His ambitions were not rewarded. Lule was elected to head the transitional government after Amin was toppled and Mwanga was elected to head the military commission. Museveni concluded that the barrel of the gun would catapult him into Uganda’s presidency. He began to prepare for the guerrilla war and to connect with outside forces that did not want Obote back into power because he was still regarded in the western capitalist camp as a socialist (although Museveni was also seen as a socialist, western interests felt he could be molded). Museveni did poorly in the 1980 elections. After that he headed for the bush in 1981 with overwhelming support of Baganda and Catholics who did not like Obote II back in power.
From outside Britain led the way in providing financial and media support through Tiny Rowland and William Pike respectively during the guerrilla war. When Museveni became president in 1986, British political support was represented by Linda Chalker, the first foreign dignitary to meet with Museveni as president and the economic advisory support came principally from Paul Collier. The Labor government continued support began during the Thatcher government. The Department for International Development (DFID) has played an active role. The World Bank (Kanyeihamba 2002) and possibly IMF began to support Museveni before he captured power. IMF withdrew support in 1984 at a very critical moment when Obote was facing tremendous difficulties as the guerrilla war intensified and drought affected exports very badly (New African 1987-88).
Thus, Museveni and his Bahororo was brought to and has been sustained in power by Bahima, Catholics and Baganda. Outside support for Museveni has been led and sustained by Britain. Ipso facto, the defeat of Museveni and his potentially explosive ambition of Bahororo hegemony over Ugandans will have to come from these same forces that have supported Museveni since 1981 supported by other Ugandans and well wishers.
Let me end on this note. When you get advice from fellow Ugandans or others please read it very carefully. Some of it is totally misleading. For example, we should not wait for outsiders to solve our problems. We should take the initiative and seek outside help to supplement our own efforts. We should also make some noise in whatever form and forum to alert the world that there is a problem in Uganda. When you keep quiet the world ignores you. We should also aim at prevention rather than cure because the latter is more expensive than the former. That is why Museveni should be defeated in February 2010 rather than start fighting him after he has been re-elected.
When you are opposed to an idea and you respond try to be civil and substantive rather than use derogatory language. The purpose of exchange is to reach a common understanding on the way forward to make life better in Uganda for present and future generations.