When you have no land and education you’re finished unless you wake up in time

Undeveloped or underdeveloped societies are characterized by a high degree of illiteracy. These societies therefore depend on land for their subsistence livelihood. As they get educated and develop non-agricultural skills, they move out of land-based activities and shift residence from rural to urban areas. The smart ones, however, keep a piece of land in the countryside just in case. In Uganda land in the countryside has saved many lives during economic and political hard times. When Amin’s government started hunting down the educated in towns, many fled the country while many others retreated to their pieces of land in the countryside where they kept a low profile and survived.

In South Africa, the minority white settlers that had wanted to rule forever decided that the best way to do it was to dispossess the black majority of their land and deny them education. The training that few blacks got was related to their work. For example, drivers were taught how to read road signs. The whites reasoned that it would be dangerous to provide education to blacks in areas where they will never work such as engineering. Blacks were therefore dispossessed of their land and denied education. I have studied the apartheid system in South Africa and written about it. In my first book titled “Critical Issues in African Development” published in 1997, I wrote two chapters on education and land ownership in South Africa.

Taking stock of NRM’s performance on the eve of 2011 elections

As Uganda heads into another round of multi-party presidential and parliamentary elections, this is the right moment to take stock of what the governing NRM party has achieved since it came to power 25 years ago. The NRM under the leadership of Museveni launched a credible and well thought out development blue print compressed into the ten-point program subsequently expanded to fifteen. This program put Ugandans at the center of development. Therefore NRM’s performance must be assessed against this principal goal.

By contrast the development program was not matched by a cadre with sufficient expertise and experience. A large number of NRM cadres did not have the requisite qualifications much less experience. Afraid of being swamped by the experienced Ugandans who did not fight the guerrilla war from 1981 to 1985, the NRM government chose not to invite qualified and experienced Ugandans in the diaspora and marginalized those at home. To fill the gap while it learned on the job, the government invited a wide range of foreign experts most of them young, inexperienced and ignorant of Uganda’s overall environment.

Background to the “Tutsi Empire” and strategies to realize it

The “Tutsi Empire” project is real and on course albeit slower than expected. The idea which had been formed earlier received a boost when USA, UK and Israel chose Museveni to be a surrogate in their pursuit of geopolitical interests in the great lakes region. Museveni would help to overthrow governments in Uganda, Rwanda, Burundi and DR Congo. In the latter three countries Anglo-Saxons would oust France from the region. According to Keith Harmon Snow “War for the control of the Democratic Republic of Congo – what should be the richest country in the world – began in Uganda in the 1980s, when now Ugandan President Yoweri Museveni shot his way to power with the backing of Buckingham Palace, the White House and Tel Aviv behind him” (Peter Phillips 2006).

Museveni who began the politics of larger geographic entities in the 1960s to reverse the effects of colonial balkanization in Africa welcomed western support that would help him to realize his dream of a ‘Tutsi Empire’. Museveni and other Tutsis falsely believe they are endowed by God to rule others initially in the area stretching from Uganda to DRC through Burundi and Rwanda. To realize the dream of a Tutsi Empire Museveni adopted a three-pronged military, economic and political strategy.

Has Museveni’s star fallen at the MDGs Summit?

Since 1986, I have attended annual debates of the United Nations General assembly in New York. From this vantage point I have watched, listened and heard world leaders deliver speeches including those by President Museveni.

During his initial visits to the UN in New York, Museveni portrayed an image of a new breed of African leaders. He conveyed a clear political, human rights and economic development message which immediately won him international recognition, causing his star to rise rapidly. He spoke eloquently and convincingly about his determination to end corruption and sectarianism forever; launch full scale democracy based on regular, free and fair elections, full participation of Uganda citizens, transparency and accountability; restore the rule of law and full respect for human rights; and end poverty and its offshoots of hunger, disease and illiteracy in Uganda.

To remove any ambiguity Museveni stressed that his goal was not to reduce but to eradicate poverty! Within a short time, he declared, Ugandans would break the poverty trap and get on a path of sustained and sustainable economic growth, social development and environmental protection for present and future generations. He was soon christened the ‘dean’ of a new breed of African leaders which included the president of Eritrea, prime minister of Ethiopia and president of Rwanda; and a regional ‘leader’ in the Horn and Great Lakes regions of Africa. He was seen as a stabilizing force in a region that for long had been marked by political instability, civil wars and economic backwardness.

NRM government is about to make another policy mistake

The introduction of structural adjustment program (SAP) in Uganda in 1981 coincided with the launch of a guerrilla war by the military wing of the National Resistance Movement (NRM) against an elected government of Uganda. Political economy analysts in the NRM carefully studied the impact of SAP conditionality in Uganda and Ghana. They concluded that the SAP model sponsored by the IMF and the World Bank was not suitable for Uganda. They drew up an alternative political economy model of a mixed economy based on private and public partnership. The model was published in 1985 as a ten-point program. It was a consensus blue print that was carefully prepared by Ugandans in consultation with a wide range of stakeholders. Thus, it was a home grown program.

Assessment of NRM record and the way forward

As preparations for 2011 elections enter the final phase, it is appropriate to examine NRM’s successes and shortcomings and make recommendations for the next government.

NRM government dropped the ten-point program in favor of stabilization and structural adjustment program (SAP) following an agreement with the IMF in 1987. Prior to the signing of the agreement, the government ran the economy without external support and faced tremendous problems including inflation which ran into triple digits. In this environment, the government had no bargaining power and swallowed all IMF and the World Bank conditionality including employing external staff and advisers to direct the design and monitor the implementation of SAP.

From the start it was known that the first three to five years of structural adjustment would be very costly in social terms as the government adjusted its resources to make savings and repay its debts which were the main objective of the program. The comforting rhetoric was that the costs would disappear and benefits of economic growth would trickle down equitably to all Ugandans. Meanwhile Ugandans were requested to tighten their belts even tighter having lost thirty percent of their savings through the conversion of the old into the new currency. It was also understood that the role of the state in the economy would be significantly reduced to permit unhindered operation of the private sector. Resource allocation would be determined by the invisible hand of the market forces. In short neo-laissez-faire would drive Uganda’s economy and distribute the benefits.

Globalization and re-colonization of Uganda

During the 2004 hearings by the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, many African participants equated globalization with the re-colonization of Africa. Many Ugandans believe that Uganda which was never fully de-colonized has already been re-colonized since entering into structural adjustment with the IMF in 1981.

In order to appreciate that re-colonization has actually occurred, one needs to understand what the objectives of colonialism were. They were to secure a strategic advantage, evangelize the natives and obtain tropical raw materials and food for British industries and population respectively and land for surplus British population; and finally markets for manufactured products.

Britain, France, Germany and Belgium conflicted over the control of areas that eventually became Uganda. The agreement between Germany and Britain involving Heligoland is well known as is the Fashoda incident between Britain and France. The interests of White settlers in Kenya and Egypt’s reliance on the waters of the Nile affected the final shape and size of Uganda. Ultimately Uganda lost big chunks of land in the east and the north to Kenya and Sudan respectively. In the south and west of Uganda land was also exchanged among Germany, Belgium and Uganda. Uganda remains a battleground for old and new colonizers as a gateway to the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. During the cold war era, Uganda sat at the intersection between the ‘red’ and ‘blue’ belt states that contributed to the 1971 coup.

Globalization and re-colonization of Uganda

During the 2004 hearings by the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, many African participants equated globalization with the re-colonization of Africa. Many Ugandans believe that Uganda which was never fully de-colonized has already been re-colonized since entering into structural adjustment with the IMF in 1981.

In order to appreciate that re-colonization has actually occurred, one needs to understand what the objectives of colonialism were. They were to secure a strategic advantage, evangelize the natives and obtain tropical raw materials and food for British industries and population respectively and land for surplus British population; and finally markets for manufactured products.

Britain, France, Germany and Belgium conflicted over the control of areas that eventually became Uganda. The agreement between Germany and Britain involving Heligoland is well known as is the Fashoda incident between Britain and France. The interests of White settlers in Kenya and Egypt’s reliance on the waters of the Nile affected the final shape and size of Uganda. Ultimately Uganda lost big chunks of land in the east and the north to Kenya and Sudan respectively. In the south and west of Uganda land was also exchanged among Germany, Belgium and Uganda. Uganda remains a battleground for old and new colonizers as a gateway to the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. During the cold war era, Uganda sat at the intersection between the ‘red’ and ‘blue’ belt states that contributed to the 1971 coup.

A Christian country governed through the barrel of the gun

Uganda is overwhelmingly a Christian country of Protestants and Catholics. One would expect that in such a God-loving and God-fearing country, people would not use force against one to resolve disagreements or answer questions. Rather one would expect people to treat one another as they would like to be treated. One would also expect the rich to help the poor, the healthy the sick and the strong the weak. That is what we were taught in our faiths. Sadly the practice has been different since the founding of Uganda as a nation.

Future Uganda government should avoid another costly experiment

Stabilization and structural adjustment programs began in 1980 largely in Latin America and Africa. Uganda and Ghana adopted them in 1981 and 1982 respectively. The ‘conditionalities’ were so stiff that governments in the two African countries expressed dissatisfaction because the human costs were very high.

In 1984 Ernest Stern, World Bank Vice-President wrote a candid report stressing that structural adjustment had failed Africa. “We … have failed in Africa, along with everyone else… we have not always designed our projects to fit the … conditions in Africa”(New African February 1993)”. Julian Samboma added that “But with their usual arrogance, the IMF/World Bank continued to force these self-same policies down Africa’s throat” (New African February 1993). In 1986 the government of Ghana officially declared that structural adjustment had failed in that country.

When NRM captured power in 1986 there was enough evidence that the shock therapy (comprehensive, simultaneous and rapid implementation) version of structural adjustment was not suitable. In fact the government hesitated to adopt any version (rapid or gradual) of structural adjustment. But when it finally did in 1987, the government went for the shock therapy form. It ignored the advice of those Ugandans at home and abroad who favored a gradual approach: some of them lost their jobs while others were sidelined.