Museveni’s image has been irreparably tarnished

Julius Nyerere of Tanzania and Nelson Mandela of South Africa left power when their images as great leaders had reached a watershed. Yoweri Museveni could have joined their ranks as a great leader not only in Africa but also the world had he stepped down at the right time. Regrettably, Museveni missed that opportunity at a great cost.

After capturing power through force, Museveni quickly established himself as the ‘dean’ of the new breed of African leaders determined to break with the past by ending sectarianism and poverty, launching democracy and the rule of law and strictly observing human rights. At home, the launching of the ten-point program which had been drafted after extensive consultations and compromise marked him as a listener and pragmatic leader. The formation of a government of national unity which embraced representatives from all political parties, all religions and all regions and took into consideration the special needs of women and disabled persons erased any lingering doubt about his sincerity to forge a new Uganda. On their part Ugandans were prepared to sacrifice even more to make him succeed.

Assessment of NRM record and the way forward

As preparations for 2011 elections enter the final phase, it is appropriate to examine NRM’s successes and shortcomings and make recommendations for the next government.

NRM government dropped the ten-point program in favor of stabilization and structural adjustment program (SAP) following an agreement with the IMF in 1987. Prior to the signing of the agreement, the government ran the economy without external support and faced tremendous problems including inflation which ran into triple digits. In this environment, the government had no bargaining power and swallowed all IMF and the World Bank conditionality including employing external staff and advisers to direct the design and monitor the implementation of SAP.

From the start it was known that the first three to five years of structural adjustment would be very costly in social terms as the government adjusted its resources to make savings and repay its debts which were the main objective of the program. The comforting rhetoric was that the costs would disappear and benefits of economic growth would trickle down equitably to all Ugandans. Meanwhile Ugandans were requested to tighten their belts even tighter having lost thirty percent of their savings through the conversion of the old into the new currency. It was also understood that the role of the state in the economy would be significantly reduced to permit unhindered operation of the private sector. Resource allocation would be determined by the invisible hand of the market forces. In short neo-laissez-faire would drive Uganda’s economy and distribute the benefits.

How Uganda can escape from least developed status

As Uganda transitions from structural adjustment (SAPs) to national planning development based on public-private partnership, a fresh non-ideological assessment of Uganda’s economy, society and ecology needs to be undertaken in a transparent and participatory manner. Ugandans of all backgrounds need to be fully engaged because they have a lot to offer. They need to be heard, not lectured to. Ugandans have a wealth of undocumented information and experience. They have witnessed many economic, social, cultural and ecological changes in their communities. For these reasons they have developed definitions which differ in some cases from the classic cases.

The definition of poverty, for example, goes beyond the classic income poverty. To the income and material poverty they have added absence of social support systems that represent a feeling of isolation and exclusion, helplessness, insecurity and deprivation of basic human rights together with a feeling of voicelessness to influence conditions around them. Therefore pro-poor policies, strategies and programs need to go beyond standard definition based on income alone.

Conversations with farmers on the challenges they face have emphasized drought and increasingly floods, food losses and low purchasing power. These concerns are confirmed in official reports.

Future Uganda government should avoid another costly experiment

Stabilization and structural adjustment programs began in 1980 largely in Latin America and Africa. Uganda and Ghana adopted them in 1981 and 1982 respectively. The ‘conditionalities’ were so stiff that governments in the two African countries expressed dissatisfaction because the human costs were very high.

In 1984 Ernest Stern, World Bank Vice-President wrote a candid report stressing that structural adjustment had failed Africa. “We … have failed in Africa, along with everyone else… we have not always designed our projects to fit the … conditions in Africa”(New African February 1993)”. Julian Samboma added that “But with their usual arrogance, the IMF/World Bank continued to force these self-same policies down Africa’s throat” (New African February 1993). In 1986 the government of Ghana officially declared that structural adjustment had failed in that country.

When NRM captured power in 1986 there was enough evidence that the shock therapy (comprehensive, simultaneous and rapid implementation) version of structural adjustment was not suitable. In fact the government hesitated to adopt any version (rapid or gradual) of structural adjustment. But when it finally did in 1987, the government went for the shock therapy form. It ignored the advice of those Ugandans at home and abroad who favored a gradual approach: some of them lost their jobs while others were sidelined.

From success story to genocide in Rwanda

The world we live in is very unpredictable and Rwanda is a good example. Until the economic crisis that started in 1989 with the collapse of coffee prices on the international market, Habyarimana’s economic and social programs had been hailed by the international community and Rwandese as success story to be emulated by the rest of Africa. By 1990, a weakened Rwanda was under attack and the government collapsed in 1994 in the midst of genocide. What caused the change of circumstances – from success story to genocide in a four year period?

Chris Atim has reported that four developments contributed to a quick shift from success story to genocide. But first, let us briefly examine the economic and social situation between 1973 when Habyarimana became president in a bloodless coup and 1989 when the price of coffee on the international market plummeted.

Museveni has deceived the world about democracy in Uganda

Not too long ago, I had a conversation with an old friend. We discussed a wide range of global issues and accidentally stumbled on Uganda. My friend confirmed what others have been saying that Uganda and Museveni have become indivisible – you cannot discuss Uganda meaningfully without putting Museveni at the center. He added a new dimension – Museveni is two persons in one. He elaborated by observing that what Museveni says about Uganda is often different from what he does. He emphasized that the difference between rhetoric and action is planned. He suggested an analysis of what Museveni says about democracy and what has actually occurred on the ground. Below are the findings.

Museveni has stressed that meaningful democracy must embrace “government of the people, by the people and for the people”. He adds that in the case of Uganda democracy must be three-dimensional: “parliamentary democracy, popular democracy and a decent level of living for every Ugandan… There should be an elected government, elected at regular intervals and such elections must be free of corruption and manipulation of the population… There must be people’s committees at the village, Muluka [parish], gombolola [sub-county], saza [county] and district level…

Why has Rukungiri district become ungovernable?

Rukungiri is a small district located in southwest Uganda and far away from the seat of government in Kampala. Since Uganda’s independence in 1962, Rukungiri has been visited by Uganda presidents – Obote, Amin and more so by Museveni – or sent more delegations to Kampala than any other district in an attempt to understand and solve the district’s intractable problems. These problems of a political, economic, social and ethnic nature have included suicide, death or injuries from security forces’ gunfire, forcing people into exile or fleeing permanently from the district, snatching voting cards from opposition members at gun point and using some unsealed ballot boxes including in the opposition presidential candidate’s polling station.

Although many people do not want to hear it, the problem in Rukungiri district is the political and economic struggle between Nilotic Bahororo rulers and Bantu Bairu (slaves) ruled ethnic groups since pre-colonial days. Bahororo – a Batutsi and numerically very inferior group that entered Rukungiri district in 1800 from Rwanda via short-lived Mpororo kingdom located in southwest of former Ankole district – believe that God created them to rule others irrespective of their education and/or work experience. In fact Bahororo agree that God gave Bairu physical and mental strength to labor for the comfort of their Bahororo masters who have specialized in military strength. This superiority complex of Bahororo was consolidated during British colonial rule that used pre-colonial oppressive chiefs as their civil servants. Britain which never lost control over Uganda has continued to favor Bahororo over Bairu since independence.

Why has Museveni survived so long in spite of serious flaws?

A while back I talked with some people who are familiar with Uganda’s political economy situation. We touched, inter alia, on the dangerously deteriorating social and environmental conditions in urban and rural areas which under normal circumstances would have created serious problems for Museveni in cabinet, parliament and the general population. Yet Museveni keeps on getting nominated for re-election. In true democratic terms where the public freely and fairly chooses the party candidate, one participant observed, Museveni would possibly not be re-nominated, much less re-elected. He has managed to stay in power by purchasing loyalty of the Uganda elites in the military and administration, and by aligning himself with western interests in economic, political and security areas.

How Bahororo captured and have sustained power in Uganda

Many Ugandans and non-Ugandans alike still wrongly believe that Museveni and his Bahororo people led a guerrilla war starting in 1981 because of the so-called rigged elections of December 1980. The truth of the matter is that Bahororo have harbored the idea of dominating Uganda politics in order to restore Mpororo kingdom which was absorbed into the Ankole kingdom – hence the complications surrounding the restoration of Ankole kingdom.

Museveni and his very close advisers are Bahororo. Bahororo are Batutsi from Rwanda whose ancestors were Nilotic Luo-speaking people who moved into the great lakes region from Bahr el Ghazal of southern Sudan some 600 years ago. Under the leadership of Kahaya Rutindangyezi the Batutsi from Rwanda founded Mpororo kingdom in mid-17th century. The kingdom covered northern Rwanda and parts of southwest Ankole (Ntungamo district). The kingdom disintegrated within 100 years due to internal family feuds. Although they lost the kingdom (and many Bahororo returned to Rwanda while others moved to other parts of Uganda), Bahororo never lost the idea of restoring the kingdom, perhaps on a larger scale – hence the idea of creating the East African Federation or Tutsi Empire.

Museveni has become a liability to his sponsors

When Museveni was waging his bloody guerrilla war in the early 1980s he gave the impression that he was a uniter in contrast to his predecessors who had been viewed as dividers along sectarian lines. Consequently many Ugandans across the country sponsored his cause.

When he became president in 1986 he formed a cabinet that truly reflected his determination to unify all the people of Uganda. He even defined an economic policy that reflected accommodation of various interests. Then he announced that only individual merit would determine recruitment, assignment, promotion and awarding of scholarships. He advised that political activities would be suspended until national unity had attained a level that sectarianism would not raise its ugly head in Uganda politics. His popularity at home soared!

In May 1987, Museveni’s government entered into a stabilization and structural adjustment agreement with the International Monetary Fund and later with the World Bank. The government adopted the ‘shock therapy’ version of comprehensive and simultaneous implementation of all the elements in the structural adjustment package that was favored by the donor community. “He [Museveni] quickly became the darling of the West when he embraced the IMF/World Bank prescribed Structural Adjustment Programs, cutting down on civil service and social services expenditure and sacrificing state parastatals on the alter of liberalization” (Business in Africa. April 2001).