Some Ugandans either because they work for Museveni or are not familiar with lessons of political history dismiss the possibility that Ugandans can remove Museveni from power because he enjoys solid international, military and religious support. But this is exactly what former president of the Philippines, the late Ferdinand Marcos enjoyed. What drove Marcos out of power is exactly what has been accumulating in Uganda.
Ferdinand Marcos a firmly unshakeable dictator was elected president in 1965 and reelected for the second and final term in 1969 because of presidential two term limits. Marcos and his wife Imelda did not come from wealthy families. However, Marcos had credentials to do an excellent job as leader of his country. At the time he was elected president his compatriots thought he was a war hero (it turned out to be false) with a good academic record as a lawyer and had been jailed for political reasons. He had also served as an elected member of the House of Representatives and Senate rising to the position of Senate president.
Ipso facto, Marcos could have gone down in history “as the greatest Philippine president ever. Instead, he is now universally regarded with scorn and derision, portrayed, along with his wife Imelda, as the world-class thief who bled his country dry while lining his own pockets with ill-gotten wealth” (Larry Diamond 1992). “The beneficiaries apart from the Marcoses themselves and favored military leaders were a small group of friends and relatives who were provided with lucrative monopolies, government contracts and cheap finance. ‘Crony capitalism’ was taken to spectacular heights in the late 1970s. Through all of this, Marcos and his family acquired enormous personal wealth, with the removal of the boundary between state finances and personal income. Corruption and nepotism were practiced on an unprecedented scale” (Peter Church 2006).
Initially, Marcos’ policies attracted foreign investment and the country experienced a healthy economic growth. However, political and economic challenges emerged that destabilized the regime.
1. Constitutionally Marcos was barred from a third term.
2. The economic and social golden age of the 1950s and 1960s had ended. The economy was stagnant, per capita income was falling and foreign debt was rising rapidly leading to discontent and protest especially by middle class and students.
To solve these challenges, Marcos declared martial law in 1972 and created a New Society with support of the military, international community and the Catholic Church under the leadership of Cardinal Sin.
1. He replaced democracy with ‘constitutional authoritarianism’ which he saw as being more in keeping with Philippino society.
2. He promised law and order to attract more foreign investments, construction of infrastructure and land reform as well as ending endemic corruption.
3. He centralized state power and relied on personal loyalties largely from army commanders.
The New Society did not deliver on promises. And by 1980s the country faced the danger of falling apart. People’s rights including freedom of expression and from arbitrary arrest were violated en masse. Notwithstanding massive human rights violations, resistance was insignificant largely because the population was afraid of the dictator’s wrath.
The fear came to an end and opposition became more public with a large following led by middle class and students following the assassination of Benigno Aquino in August 1983 at Manila airport as he arrived from exile. Aquino was Marco’s most prominent and popular political opponent. As Felix B. Bautista aptly observes “We lost our fear when Aquino died. His murder forced our hitherto timid group to reexamine its priorities. We decided to establish a publication that ‘would dare tell the truth’” (Larry Diamond 1992). Week after week the publication known as Veritas repeated the same message that “the government must go”.
Corazon Aquino widow of assassinated Aquino preached change of government by civil disobedience through boycott, non-payment of taxes and rejection of all unjust laws. The international community also became aware of Marcos’ brutal dictatorship.
The Catholic Church under Cardinal Sin leadership turned against Marcos who had used any means including bribery to rig the election and stay in power. Cardinal Sin told the Philippinos that “An immoral contract is not binding. If a candidate has given you money you are under no obligation to vote for that candidate. Accept the money for you are poor and it is the people’s money anyway”. In response to a threat, Cardinal Sin said “This is not a contest between two presidential candidates. It is a fight between the forces of good and the forces of evil. In such a fight the church cannot stay neutral” (Larry Diamond 1992).
The final straw that broke Marcos’ back came in 1986. During a snap presidential election Corazon Aquino overwhelmingly defeated Marcos. But Marcos refused to concede defeat. The people together with church leaders and elements in the military led by Enrile and Ramos backed Aquino and sent Marcos into exile. “Through People Power and Prayer Power the bloodless revolution succeeded in unseating Marcos. Corazon Aquino was sworn in as president on February 25, 1986” (Larry Diamond 1992).
Before concluding let us note that East Timor’s first attempt to achieve independence from Indonesia by violent insurgency failed. Yet almost two decades later, East Timorese resorted to non-violent tactics, defeated Indonesian troops and won independence.
Erica Chenoweth and Maria J. Stephan (2011) have also argued that “nonviolent campaigns have a participation advantage over violent insurgencies, which is an important factor in determining campaign outcomes. The moral, physical, informational, and commitment barriers are much lower for nonviolent resistance than for violent insurgency. Higher levels of participation contribute to a number of mechanisms necessary for success, including enhanced resilience, higher probabilities of tactical innovation, expanded civic disruption (thereby raising the costs to the regime of maintaining the status quo), and loyalty shifts involving the opponent’s erstwhile supporters [including those in the military]is a more reliable source of power than the support of external allies, which many violent campaigns must obtain to compensate for their lack of participants.
Moreover, we find that the transitions that occur in the wake of successful nonviolent resistance movements create much more durable and internally peaceful democracies than transitions provoked by violent insurgencies. On the whole, nonviolent resistance campaigns are more effective in getting results and, once they have succeeded, more likely to establish democratic regimes with a lower probability of a relapse into civil war”.
To succeed nonviolent resistance must obtain broad-based, diverse and robust participation capable to erode the power base of the opponent. A helping hand from neighbors, friends and well wishers is also essential to pave the way by denying the adversary financial, technical and diplomatic support. However, if nonviolent means are frustrated by opponent’s overwhelming use of military power, then use of force by groups opposed to the regime as a defensive mechanism cannot be ruled out.
With this information, Ugandans who still doubt people power to succeed in removing a dictator from power through non-violent struggle should rethink their stand. In the case of the Philippines, the people, the military and the Church abandoned Marcos and his wife Imelda who had entrenched themselves in power. They were unseated by non-violent means.
Uganda is ready. All it needs is a powerful trigger and support from the church and the military and a helping hand from friends and well wishers. Hopefully the trigger will come sooner than later.