The world we live in is very unpredictable and Rwanda is a good example. Until the economic crisis that started in 1989 with the collapse of coffee prices on the international market, Habyarimana’s economic and social programs had been hailed by the international community and Rwandese as success story to be emulated by the rest of Africa. By 1990, a weakened Rwanda was under attack and the government collapsed in 1994 in the midst of genocide. What caused the change of circumstances – from success story to genocide in a four year period?
Chris Atim has reported that four developments contributed to a quick shift from success story to genocide. But first, let us briefly examine the economic and social situation between 1973 when Habyarimana became president in a bloodless coup and 1989 when the price of coffee on the international market plummeted.
Up to 1989 Rwanda’s economy had performed well and was hailed as an economic success story to be emulated by the rest of Africa. Here are a few examples of praise by people from all walks of life. Chris Atim reported that an Australian tourist in Kigali remarked that Rwanda had developed a relatively good infrastructure network. A Canadian who lived in Rwanda between 1983 and 1988 reported that Rwanda “was not a badly run place before 1989”. An Oxfam publication recounted government’s achievement prior to1989 in glowing terms: “A generally well-run economy…rewarded with an influx of aid money of more than $200 million a year. The money had been visibly put to use: the road network had been transformed so that all prefectures (except one) were linked by asphalted roads; water systems had been put in place, so that almost 70 percent of the rural population had access to safe drinking water… a fleet of buses were provided to link all prefectures and sub-prefectures on a daily basis…”(West Africa June 27-July 3 1994). Catharine Newbury records that the 1970s and1980s saw increased production of food and coffee crops. “The international community has applauded such advances. A 1989 World Bank report singled out Rwanda as a ‘successful case of adaptation’, where government policies had successfully encouraged growth in agricultural production. ‘Rwanda avoided the urban bias [which Kagame’s government has adopted] so common in Africa. Government remained attentive to the farming majority in determining pricing policy, exchange rate policy, fiscal priorities, and effective rural institutions”(G. Hyden & M. Bratton 1992).
David Walker (1993) adds that “Offices had been built at national, prefectoral and communal levels; the housing of the average peasant had been improved; a peasants’ bank had been created, with over 100 branches ‘on the hills’; the electricity and telephone networks had been extended… and the government civil services had been enlarged, trained and equipped with officials who were better paid than any others in the region”. The donor community regarded Rwanda as a model of development efficiency. During the 1980s, “the US provided the Rwandan government with significant development aid… Other donors were also impressed, and many were generous. From 1980 to 1986, Rwanda received at least $200 million in new aid commitments every year except one. In 1987 the total soared to $340 million (M. N. Dobkowski and I. Willimann 1998)
The success story was followed by adverse developments including the economic crisis beginning in 1989, civil war starting in 1990, imposed democratization and structural adjustment. The economic crisis was triggered by the price of coffee which fell by 50 percent on the international market in 1989. Concurrently there was famine caused by drought which aggravated the situation. As the economic situation worsened and external debts mounted, development partners used this difficult environment to force political and economic reforms. The government was forced to formulate and implement a structural adjustment program of the ‘shock therapy’ type in 1990 including balanced budget, meaning that it could not even expand the army sufficiently to confront the RPF invasion from Uganda. “This neo-liberal ‘shock therapy’ [program] dramatically worsened the situation, ensuring that almost every family suffered a major reduction in income. Discontent with the regime intensified. Rural unemployment and indebtedness forced young men to flock to towns, to hang about the streets desperate for economic crumbs… Economic hardship increased discontent…Economic discontent weakened and destabilized the regime” (Michael Mann 2005).
About the same time, external demand for political democratization was increased. “As the popularity of the government fell [from the economic crisis], at first it tried to resist the inevitable, but soon gave in and in July 1990, opposition parties were allowed”(West Africa June 30- July 3 1994).
Against this economic and political backdrop, the RPF, with strong backing of the Uganda government, invaded Rwanda from the northeast of the country. “The timing of the [RPF] invasion also coincided with an increase in social and political tensions in Rwanda in 1989 and 1990, precipitated by severe economic decline and exacerbated by intersecting international pressure. When the RPF invaded in 1990, the country was socially strained, economically and environmentally destitute, and politically fractured”(T. M. Ali and R. O. Matthews 1999).
As the civil war progressed, the government was dragged to the negotiating table in Arusha, Tanzania. As Chris Otim observed “The regime was virtually dragged, kicking and screaming, to the negotiating table, and was forced to accept the terms of the settlement [Arusha Accords] by both the FPR’s [RPF] military prowess and the international mediators…
“Trapped between FPR’s [RPF] army and Arusha [Accords], the regime tried some desperate tactics. While negotiating under duress and ostensibly with a view to power-sharing it was preparing secretly to wipe out the political opposition in the country… There were several signs of this [which the international community ignored]” (West Africa June 30-July 2, 1994). The shooting down of the presidential plane, killing the presidents of Rwanda and Burundi unleashed forces that resulted into the 1994 genocide against moderate Hutus and Tutsi.
To conclude, external factors (collapse of coffee prices on the international market, imposition of structural adjustment and democratization and the terms of the Arusha Accords and the failure of the international community to act) contributed significantly to the Rwanda genocide of 1994.