On July 4, 2012, my articles on Ugandans at Heart Forum generated a vibrant, constructive and informative as well as – I must add thankfully – civil debate. Even those who were rough in the past were gentle this time. Those who tried to divert attention from the core message of my articles in the hope of discouraging further writing along similar lines ended up confirming what I have been saying all along; namely that NRM has destroyed Uganda – intentionally or otherwise – which is now a failed state under a military dictatorship (so that NRM stays in power an extra day because it has lost popular support) no matter what the defenders of NRM – in or out of government – may say. Others concurred that Uganda is indeed in deep trouble but complained that NRM has been disproportionately bashed. Overall, there is agreement that NRM has performed far below expectation and has therefore failed the test. We have discussed at length what has gone wrong and the factors involved since NRM came to power in 1986. The differences have narrowed considerably on the following factors behind NRM failed performance.
First, Museveni has been the tap root of Uganda’s problems. He, like Louis XIV of France (he said he was the state and absolutely in charge), equated himself with the state, considering himself the only person in Uganda with a vision and would not step down unless and until there was one he could trust and he hasn’t found one since 1986 (he recently launched campaign for a fifth term in Sheema with the help of a youth – possibly greedy or confused – MP from the area). Museveni would not listen, much less respond, to views of fellow Ugandans especially those he categorized as belonging to the opposition.
Believing he was the only mature bull on the hill, Museveni made wrong after wrong decisions that have driven Uganda in a wrong direction. Like Louis, Museveni is obsessed with the notion of expansiveness and glory which has involved him in unnecessary and expensive wars, wasteful expenditure on hosting international conferences (soon after he took power, he hosted the East African community ministerial meeting when he didn’t even have adequate space to accommodate delegates, I was among them) and expensive items like the presidential jet. It doesn’t make sense that a government that claims has no money to provide primary school children with lunch of maize and beans should purchase such a luxurious jet.
Second, Museveni dismissed or marginalized Ugandans with internationally recognized expertise and experience and replaced them with NRM cadres many of whom basically had no education, much less experience. Ugandans in the diaspora with rich knowledge and experience were simply instructed to stay put except for a few from his tribe. With due respect, a minister or ambassador with high school diploma, or a degree obtained from night classes offered at Makerere University through a mass education program, however dedicated s/he might be cannot cope with the rigors of a globalizing, knowledge-based economy and society. I have had many occasions to interact with some of them and observe them perform at international conferences and can confirm that most do not measure up. So Uganda has missed opportunities because the representatives can’t cope with negotiations (barter trade is a case in point).
Museveni has made another blunder of assigning qualified and experienced staff to portfolios they are not qualified for. Again with due respect, why would a medical doctor be appointed a minister of finance, foreign affairs or agriculture? Museveni has also had an obsession with lawyers especially those he was with in Dar es Salaam (currently the Vice President, Speaker of Parliament and Prime Minister are lawyers). Lawyers are everywhere. At the same time for reasons best known to him, Museveni isn’t fond of economists, the very professionals he needed and needs now more than ever to help address the daunting economic challenges where the economic growth rate has fallen below the population growth rate, signifying deterioration in the standard of living.
Third, Museveni adopted the most draconian – shock therapy – version of structural adjustment program (SAP) when he was fully aware of its serious social and environmental impact from experiences in Chile, Ghana, Senegal and Uganda under Obote II. He was also aware of the resistance that Tanzania put up and got a better deal. He rejected advice on slow and sequenced approach to minimize suffering of the people. He refused to make adjustments along the way like other governments. For example, Thatcher the most advocate of structural adjustment made changes in the UK’s program. Monetarism the anchor of her program was abandoned in favor of managing interest and exchange rate instruments, public spending increased instead of decreased and provided unemployment relief through various training and employment programs for young people (D. Kavanagh 1990). Further, governments including those in UK, Chile and Senegal made staff changes (note the dismissal of entire Chicago Boys in Chile) in the key ministry of finance and brought in new people with different ideas to make necessary changes.
Museveni adhered strictly to the original shock therapy conditionality set by IMF and the World Bank characterized by macroeconomic stability especially inflation control to 5 percent, high interest rates, excessive devaluation of the Uganda shilling, continued export of food while Ugandans starved, retrenchment of public servants, employing foreign experts and advisers, trade and price liberalization, privatization of public enterprises including those that needed only management reforms, application of market forces and laissez faire policies as the engine of growth and job creation and trickledown economics for income distribution to all classes and regions. Museveni has also retained the same senior staff he placed in the ministry of finance and central bank and presidential advisers on economic matters for 26 years. Consequently none is in a position to sound an alarm. Those who do so from the outside are branded saboteurs. All they care for is to maintain the status quo because any change would sweep them out of power. They have even refused to comment on UDU’s National Recovery Plan.
In return for sticking to SAP conditionality and turning Uganda into a guinea pig, Museveni got full backing of IMF and World Bank that convinced other donors to do the same in order to continue the experiment in stabilization and structural adjustment program. Museveni got his money, technical advisers, delayed elections that gave him an opportunity to severely damage UPC and DP and build NRM and to rig elections with impunity since 1996. He also got false praise in the international media as the star pupil and success story and dean of a new breed of African leaders. Reporting Uganda’s economic and social performance got distorted in favor of growth rates and per capita income. At times figures presented by the president and minister of finance covering the same period and sectors have differed. UPE was praised in terms of gross enrolment when it was known that the dropout rate was high and accelerating, giving lower net enrolment figures; quality of education was swept under the carpet. Instead of reporting adverse impact of food exports such as malnutrition, underweight children and environmental degradation reports praised Uganda sky high for big success in increasing and diversifying commodity exports. Unemployment especially of youth was explained away in terms of laziness and drunkenness, blaming the victims of structural adjustment.
For a while, Museveni became a regular participant at the G8 annual Summits of the most industrialized and powerful nations in the world. With donors firmly on his side, complacency set in. Museveni began to boast that there was no problem he could not handle and Uganda would be an industrial country within fifteen years. He even began in a big way to divert development funds into constructing an expensive security apparatus apparently for keeping Uganda stable for foreign investors (by clapping down on riots against the pains caused by SAP).
In the name of decentralization, he divided up the country into miniscule and economically unviable districts, expanded parliament and cabinet to buy political support thereby increasing administrative costs and inefficiency (it is more difficult for a large cabinet of ministers to reach a decision than a smaller one). With money still around which the incompetent officials could not manage, corruption crept in and public money simply disappeared into private pockets while the donors watched. They wanted their SAP experiment to succeed. Until then, they didn’t want to disturb Museveni who also took advantage of that atmosphere, wasted public funds and messed up democracy (eliminating presidential term limits and refusing an independent electoral commission) and governance (rampant corruption, sectarianism and cronyism) that hurt the economy and people in the process.
In 2009, the world came to its senses and declared structural assistance a failure and was officially abandoned. Museveni had no choice but to officially declare structural adjustment dead in the same year. He came up with a Five Year National Development Plan (NDP) as replacement without clearance by parliament. The NDP contained most of the SAP elements. I wrote in (Uganda) Observer that NDP was dead on arrival because I was convinced Museveni’s heart wasn’t in it.
A few months ago the prime minister announced that NDP had not been implemented and was gathering dust on the shelves in the department of planning. With SAP abolished and NDP gathering dust in the department of planning, Museveni has since 2009 been running the country without guidance. It’s no wonder that last year the economy grew slower at 3.2 percent against a population growth rate of 3.5 percent, signifying that poverty is increasing. A recent poll revealed that 81 percent of Ugandans are poorer. When you have poverty of this magnitude, as in Uganda, population growth inevitably occurs through higher fertility. In the case of Uganda uncontrolled immigrants have added to rapid population growth. In these circumstances naturalization of millions of illegal immigrants and refugees as rumor has it will increase pressure on resources, causing conflicts and will encourage others from densely populated neighbors to flock to Uganda and seek naturalization. The political situation in neighboring countries has improved significantly. It is only fair that people we gave a home when they needed it should return to their homes.
You now can see why NRM stumbled at the first hurdle and never recovered. The leadership style of the president and the way he was treated by the donor community did not help NRM to achieve its goals as contained in the ten – point program. NRM has reached a point of no return. Keeping it in power will be a fundamental mistake. While donor support will continue to be needed, post-NRM governments should beware of the shortcomings Uganda has experienced under Museveni’s leadership. These shortcomings were taken into full consideration while drawing up the National Recovery Plan UDU will use should it get into power. It has been widely circulated, commented on and appreciated for its substance, coverage and action-oriented recommendations. NRP which has formed the basis of ongoing civic education in fulfillment of our commitment to promote transparency and participation is posted at www.udugandans.org
Eric Kashambuzi
Secretary General & Chief Administrator, UDU