The second African star has fallen

On April 19, 2010, President Museveni launched a five-year development plan in Uganda with a focus, inter alia, on full employment and state intervention, reminiscent of Keynesian economic model which drove the post world war economic boom until the second half of the 1970s when a combination of stagnant economic growth, rising unemployment and inflation (stagflation) rendered the model irrelevant. It was replaced by the Washington Consensus or stabilization and structural adjustment programs (SAPs). Unlike the Keynesian model which focused on creating jobs and promoting state participation in the economy, the Washington Consensus focused, inter alia, on macroeconomic stability through inflation control and private sector participation in the economy as the engine of growth under the guidance of the invisible hand of the market forces and a trickle down mechanism.

In Africa Ghana was among the first countries to embrace the Washington Consensus. A combination of factors which included excess capacity, the return of Ghanaians from Nigeria that boosted the numbers of cheap labor, generous donations, good weather including adequate rainfall, favorable trade conditions, guidance from the IMF, the World Bank and prominent international development economists as well as a committed government under the leadership of Jerry Rawlings, Ghana registered rapid economic growth and per capita GDP. It became a “star performer and success story” to be emulated by other developing countries.

The trouble with NRM double standards

Since 1980 when the Uganda People’s Congress (UPC) won the general elections and the National Resistance Movement (NRM) began a guerrilla war in 1981 to unseat the UPC government by force since the Uganda People’s Movement (UPM) had failed to defeat UPC at the polls, I have followed NRM’s policy statements to the present day in 2010. NRM’s statements before 1986 are contained in two publications – Yoweri Museveni (1985), Selected Articles on the Uganda Resistance War; and Mission to Freedom (1990). I have had the opportunity to read the contents of the two publications.

NRM’s policy statements since 1986 are found in many publications or hard copies that have been distributed at conferences and summits. Since 1986, I have had the opportunity to attend major conferences and summits at the OAU/AU and United Nations in New York where these statements have been delivered by senior civil servants, Ambassadors, Ministers and the President.

Intermarriage per se does not justify symbiotic ethnic relationship

Any conversation about the Great Lakes region of Africa is likely to touch on ethnic relations. During my mission (January/February 2010) to DRC, Burundi and Rwanda ethnic issues came up in the three countries. Those who argue that there are no ethnic problems resort to using intermarriage as a justification. While in Burundi, the topic of extensive intermarriage came up at times when it was out of context.

In Uganda senior officials have endorsed the institution of intermarriage as a national unifying factor. And we should applaud that. But we need to examine the kind of intermarriage that has occurred between Batutsi/Bahima and Bahutu/Bairu in the region to be able to determine whether that is the model we should promote.

I will be brief because I have written on the subject several times. Let me stress at the outset that I support the institution of intermarriage but it has to be a two way relationship between ethnic groups to be meaningful and unifying. It also has to be combined with other considerations such as social interaction and equal access to opportunities by all ethnic groups based on merit. A few illustrative examples will be used about intermarriages and other social relations that have taken place so far.

Museveni’s end of 2009 address suffers from obscurantism

During his first inaugural address in 1986, Yoweri Museveni denounced the philosophy of obscurantism, a situation where ideas are deliberately obscured. Because NRM and its leadership were not interested in the politics of obscurantism, they, like good doctors, would diagnose correctly the ills of Ugandan society before announcing corrective measures. He touched on Uganda’s core development challenge when he condemned Uganda leaders who travel in executive jets while 90 percent of Ugandans have no shoes.

After a careful and comprehensive analysis, NRM recommended solutions to Uganda’s economic and social ills in a ten-point program in which, inter alia, production for domestic and external markets would be balanced and Uganda would be metamorphosed into an integrated, self-sustaining and independent economy.

On January 26, 1990, President Museveni announced a major economic policy shift that abandoned the popular ten-point program in favor of the Washington Consensus based on market forces and laissez-faire capitalism. He embraced export-led growth that diversified into non-traditional exports mostly of foodstuffs traditionally grown for domestic consumption.

The president and his government did not tell the nation that the shift was dictated by donors as a condition for financial and technical assistance. The government opened the country to all stakeholders with new ideas knowing full well that many of them were experimental and may undermine Uganda’s development prospects.

Uganda will develop only when donors relax their conditionality

Pre-colonial communities that later formed Uganda produced and traded in local and regional markets and consumed a wide range of products based on local endowments. Economic activities included a variety of crop cultivation, herding livestock, fishing, salt extraction and manufacturing enterprises especially those producing iron, wooden, skin and bark products.

Besides a strategic motive to control the source of the Nile, Uganda was colonized to produce raw materials for British industries and a market for British manufactured products. Lord Lugard stated clearly that the growing population in Europe and industrial expansion led to a desire for new markets for manufactured products, tropical raw materials for British industry and foodstuffs to supplement decreased home production and feed increasing British population (A. Seidman 1972). Consequently, Uganda was reduced to a producer and exporter of raw materials and an importer of manufactured products.

Economic discussions by Ugandans before independence emphasized manufacturing enterprises to transform a colonial economy and society, create jobs and add value to exports. However, the British had a different plan. As independence became inevitable, the British government invited the World Bank to evaluate development possibilities for Uganda. The World Bank’s principal recommendation was that Uganda should accelerate and diversify agricultural production primarily for export purposes (A. Seidman 1972).