Assessment of NRM record and the way forward

As preparations for 2011 elections enter the final phase, it is appropriate to examine NRM’s successes and shortcomings and make recommendations for the next government.

NRM government dropped the ten-point program in favor of stabilization and structural adjustment program (SAP) following an agreement with the IMF in 1987. Prior to the signing of the agreement, the government ran the economy without external support and faced tremendous problems including inflation which ran into triple digits. In this environment, the government had no bargaining power and swallowed all IMF and the World Bank conditionality including employing external staff and advisers to direct the design and monitor the implementation of SAP.

From the start it was known that the first three to five years of structural adjustment would be very costly in social terms as the government adjusted its resources to make savings and repay its debts which were the main objective of the program. The comforting rhetoric was that the costs would disappear and benefits of economic growth would trickle down equitably to all Ugandans. Meanwhile Ugandans were requested to tighten their belts even tighter having lost thirty percent of their savings through the conversion of the old into the new currency. It was also understood that the role of the state in the economy would be significantly reduced to permit unhindered operation of the private sector. Resource allocation would be determined by the invisible hand of the market forces. In short neo-laissez-faire would drive Uganda’s economy and distribute the benefits.

Shortcut actions and long term consequences

In my culture we have a proverb “bugubugu tehisa”, meaning that if you apply too much cooking fire for quick results you will serve a poor meal. Consequently, we were taught to apply gentle fire so that the food cooks slowly for good results. This principle apparently applies to other human activities with long term adverse outcomes.

One of the reasons put forward for political instability in Uganda is that independence was achieved too early before national consciousness had developed to remove or minimize ethnic, religious and economic divides. The British policy of ‘divide and rule’ in addition to ‘indirect rule system’ that favored Protestant chiefs and their families and relatives over others in education, employment and political capital created a wide divide. To this divide was added the economic inequalities between the south and the north. The south became the economic and social development center while the north became the labor reserve providing men and increasingly women in police, prisons and the army and labor for economic activities in the south.

Do not force Ugandans into birth control

In the past few months there has been a flurry of meetings in the country and articles in Uganda media about the dangers of Uganda’s population ‘explosion’. All the articles I have read are one-sided. They are directly or indirectly urging the government to coerce Ugandans into defusing a demographic ‘bomb’ through birth control which should be stepped up immediately. If my understanding of what is going on is correct, Ugandans are being treated like a herd of Zebras that have no capacity to adjust to their environment. If you lock them up in an enclosed area and leave them there, Zebras will reproduce to the limit of their biological capacity, eat all the grass and drink all the water and then perish through hunger and thirst. To prevent this catastrophe, Zebras need to be helped to control their fertility to match the available pasture and water. Similarly, Uganda authorities are being urged to act quickly and help or force Ugandans to adjust their fertility through birth control to match the number of mouths to feed with available goods and services. In my view, going down this road will create serious problems.

Globalization and re-colonization of Uganda

During the 2004 hearings by the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, many African participants equated globalization with the re-colonization of Africa. Many Ugandans believe that Uganda which was never fully de-colonized has already been re-colonized since entering into structural adjustment with the IMF in 1981.

In order to appreciate that re-colonization has actually occurred, one needs to understand what the objectives of colonialism were. They were to secure a strategic advantage, evangelize the natives and obtain tropical raw materials and food for British industries and population respectively and land for surplus British population; and finally markets for manufactured products.

Britain, France, Germany and Belgium conflicted over the control of areas that eventually became Uganda. The agreement between Germany and Britain involving Heligoland is well known as is the Fashoda incident between Britain and France. The interests of White settlers in Kenya and Egypt’s reliance on the waters of the Nile affected the final shape and size of Uganda. Ultimately Uganda lost big chunks of land in the east and the north to Kenya and Sudan respectively. In the south and west of Uganda land was also exchanged among Germany, Belgium and Uganda. Uganda remains a battleground for old and new colonizers as a gateway to the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. During the cold war era, Uganda sat at the intersection between the ‘red’ and ‘blue’ belt states that contributed to the 1971 coup.

Globalization and re-colonization of Uganda

During the 2004 hearings by the World Commission on the Social Dimension of Globalization, many African participants equated globalization with the re-colonization of Africa. Many Ugandans believe that Uganda which was never fully de-colonized has already been re-colonized since entering into structural adjustment with the IMF in 1981.

In order to appreciate that re-colonization has actually occurred, one needs to understand what the objectives of colonialism were. They were to secure a strategic advantage, evangelize the natives and obtain tropical raw materials and food for British industries and population respectively and land for surplus British population; and finally markets for manufactured products.

Britain, France, Germany and Belgium conflicted over the control of areas that eventually became Uganda. The agreement between Germany and Britain involving Heligoland is well known as is the Fashoda incident between Britain and France. The interests of White settlers in Kenya and Egypt’s reliance on the waters of the Nile affected the final shape and size of Uganda. Ultimately Uganda lost big chunks of land in the east and the north to Kenya and Sudan respectively. In the south and west of Uganda land was also exchanged among Germany, Belgium and Uganda. Uganda remains a battleground for old and new colonizers as a gateway to the Great Lakes region and the Horn of Africa. During the cold war era, Uganda sat at the intersection between the ‘red’ and ‘blue’ belt states that contributed to the 1971 coup.

External influence has destroyed Uganda’s independence

Ugandans struggled for independence to have freedom and determine their destiny. They had seen their resources exploited for the benefit of the mother country. They had witnessed their industries and markets destroyed to make room for European manufactured products. Uganda’s demand for independence grew out of the struggle by Africans to have a stake in the cash economy which was dominated by Europeans and Asians, keeping Africans as small holder farmers.

When British authorities finally agreed that Uganda should become independent, they retained the power to decide who would be the leader and which party would form the government. The Catholic dominated Democratic Party (DP) under the leadership of Benedicto Kiwanuka, a Catholic, won the 1961 pre-independence elections. The British and Church of England leadership was not happy. They wanted a Protestant Party led by a Protestant leader. Fresh elections were held and a coalition of Protestant parties (Uganda Peoples’ Congress {UPC} and Kabaka Yekka {KY}) formed the independence government in 1962 with Milton Obote (Protestant) as prime minister and Freddie Mutesa II (Protestant) as president. The Vice President was also a Protestant. The Democratic Party complained after it lost the 1962 elections that the Church of England led by the Archbishop of Canterbury played a decisive role in its defeat.

Revised politics of birth control

There has been a resurgence of debate on the adverse impact of Uganda’s rapid population growth. The focus has been on fertility and its impact on economic growth and development. The analysis so far has missed the migration and political dimensions. Uganda has become a magnet attracting many people from the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes Region whose fertility has not yet been assessed. The debate also appears to overlook the political dimension. Therefore, this article will focus on the politics of birth control to provide lessons that may be useful as Uganda develops its population policy.

The politics of birth control has evolved since the end of the Second World War largely within the context of power relations. Politics is the science and art of getting power and how to use it to improve one’s welfare, making it essentially a struggle among groups. In this struggle numbers matter: groups with large numbers have an advantage over those who do not. The numerically inferior group knows its disadvantage and tries various ways including birth control to weaken the numerically superior group.

How Uganda can escape from least developed status

As Uganda transitions from structural adjustment (SAPs) to national planning development based on public-private partnership, a fresh non-ideological assessment of Uganda’s economy, society and ecology needs to be undertaken in a transparent and participatory manner. Ugandans of all backgrounds need to be fully engaged because they have a lot to offer. They need to be heard, not lectured to. Ugandans have a wealth of undocumented information and experience. They have witnessed many economic, social, cultural and ecological changes in their communities. For these reasons they have developed definitions which differ in some cases from the classic cases.

The definition of poverty, for example, goes beyond the classic income poverty. To the income and material poverty they have added absence of social support systems that represent a feeling of isolation and exclusion, helplessness, insecurity and deprivation of basic human rights together with a feeling of voicelessness to influence conditions around them. Therefore pro-poor policies, strategies and programs need to go beyond standard definition based on income alone.

Conversations with farmers on the challenges they face have emphasized drought and increasingly floods, food losses and low purchasing power. These concerns are confirmed in official reports.

A Christian country governed through the barrel of the gun

Uganda is overwhelmingly a Christian country of Protestants and Catholics. One would expect that in such a God-loving and God-fearing country, people would not use force against one to resolve disagreements or answer questions. Rather one would expect people to treat one another as they would like to be treated. One would also expect the rich to help the poor, the healthy the sick and the strong the weak. That is what we were taught in our faiths. Sadly the practice has been different since the founding of Uganda as a nation.

Future Uganda government should avoid another costly experiment

Stabilization and structural adjustment programs began in 1980 largely in Latin America and Africa. Uganda and Ghana adopted them in 1981 and 1982 respectively. The ‘conditionalities’ were so stiff that governments in the two African countries expressed dissatisfaction because the human costs were very high.

In 1984 Ernest Stern, World Bank Vice-President wrote a candid report stressing that structural adjustment had failed Africa. “We … have failed in Africa, along with everyone else… we have not always designed our projects to fit the … conditions in Africa”(New African February 1993)”. Julian Samboma added that “But with their usual arrogance, the IMF/World Bank continued to force these self-same policies down Africa’s throat” (New African February 1993). In 1986 the government of Ghana officially declared that structural adjustment had failed in that country.

When NRM captured power in 1986 there was enough evidence that the shock therapy (comprehensive, simultaneous and rapid implementation) version of structural adjustment was not suitable. In fact the government hesitated to adopt any version (rapid or gradual) of structural adjustment. But when it finally did in 1987, the government went for the shock therapy form. It ignored the advice of those Ugandans at home and abroad who favored a gradual approach: some of them lost their jobs while others were sidelined.