Assessment of Museveni’s accomplishments in 25 years

Summary: The assessment of Museveni’s 25-year record in economic and political areas at national, regional, continental and global levels demonstrates triumph of failure over success.

To undertake a proper assessment of Museveni’s record one has to fully understand his overall goal. Museveni wants to be remembered as a great and bold leader at the regional, continental, commonwealth and global levels. He made this clear in early interviews after he became president. In one of them he said he would quit Uganda politics for pan-Africanism as soon as peace returned to Uganda. Thus, he has used Uganda and Ugandans as a spring board in pursuit of that larger goal. In short, leading Uganda and promoting Uganda interests were not his main reason for waging the devastating guerrilla war. Neither was it in sympathy with Baganda nor Catholics that felt had suffered under Obote leadership. Rather Museveni wanted a starting point – using Baganda and Catholic frustrations – which he failed to get in 1980 elections. The ten-point program and broad-based government at the start of his presidency were designed to consolidate his support among all Ugandans because he captured power in 1986 with a very narrow base.

Assessment of NRM record and the way forward

As preparations for 2011 elections enter the final phase, it is appropriate to examine NRM’s successes and shortcomings and make recommendations for the next government.

NRM government dropped the ten-point program in favor of stabilization and structural adjustment program (SAP) following an agreement with the IMF in 1987. Prior to the signing of the agreement, the government ran the economy without external support and faced tremendous problems including inflation which ran into triple digits. In this environment, the government had no bargaining power and swallowed all IMF and the World Bank conditionality including employing external staff and advisers to direct the design and monitor the implementation of SAP.

From the start it was known that the first three to five years of structural adjustment would be very costly in social terms as the government adjusted its resources to make savings and repay its debts which were the main objective of the program. The comforting rhetoric was that the costs would disappear and benefits of economic growth would trickle down equitably to all Ugandans. Meanwhile Ugandans were requested to tighten their belts even tighter having lost thirty percent of their savings through the conversion of the old into the new currency. It was also understood that the role of the state in the economy would be significantly reduced to permit unhindered operation of the private sector. Resource allocation would be determined by the invisible hand of the market forces. In short neo-laissez-faire would drive Uganda’s economy and distribute the benefits.