What we have learned about Obote and Museveni leadership

It is now recognized that the quality of a leader and development perspective can make or break a nation. This matter came up in one of the discussions at the United Democratic Ugandans (UDU) conference in Boston in October 2011. Requests were made for a study of the background and leadership qualities of Obote and Museveni and draw lessons that might help in selecting future leaders.

Obote was born in Lango. Museveni’s birthplace has remained unclear, raising many questions. Obote and Museveni have a common ancestry of Nilotic and Luo-speaking people (sometimes referred to as River and Lake people) who entered what later became Uganda from Bahr -el-Ghazal in South Sudan, not from Ethiopia as originally suggested. Obote was a member of the Oyima group; Museveni is of the Batutsi/Bahororo group. Ipso facto, Obote and Museveni are distant cousins.

Museveni and Obote have played high politics in Uganda rising to the level of head of state and government and commander in-chief of Uganda’s armed forces.

Obote learned politics through trade union activities in Kenya; Museveni through the barrel of the gun starting in Mozambique. Back in Uganda, Obote rose to leadership position through political negotiations between Uganda National Congress (UNC) branch which he led and Uganda Peoples Union (UPU) that merged to form UPC with Obote as leader. In preparation for independence in 1962, UPC negotiated with Kabaka Yekka (KY) to block the Democratic Party (DP) led by Ben Kiwanuka from forming the first independence government. Ben Kiwanuka a commoner and Catholic happened to be in the wrong place at the wrong time. However, DP formed the first self-government in Uganda with Ben Kiwanuka serving as the first prime minister. Thus, he should not be denied a central place in Uganda’s history and politics.

The UPC/KY coalition brought together two strange bedfellows: monarchical and conservative KY and commoner and radical UPC. In 1962 elections, the UPC/KY coalition overwhelmingly Protestant defeated DP overwhelmingly Catholic. It was clear from the start that UPC/KY coalition was a marriage of convenience, bound to run into trouble sooner rather than later. Any party could quit the marriage when conditions were right. The “Lost Counties” referendum created those conditions for the marriage to break up with serious consequences that Baganda did not forget. The defeat of DP by UPC in 1980 elections reminded Catholics of another election loss to UPC under Obote. In the process, Obote and UPC created two opponents – Baganda and Catholics. In political jargon an enemy’s enemy is a friend. Before independence DP was a common enemy of UPC and KY – hence UPC and KY coalition against DP. After the 1980 elections Baganda and Catholics became friends against a common enemy – Obote and UPC and formed a marriage of convenience with Museveni in order to defeat Obote. They could not wait for the next elections. Force under the command of Museveni had to be used, resulting in a five year guerrilla war of massive destruction and displacement of survivors.

Thus, Museveni gained national leadership position through the barrel of the gun with support of mercenaries, Baganda and Catholics. The disgruntled Acholi soldiers in the national army rebelled against Obote and drove him out of power in 1985, paving the way for Museveni guerrillas to roll into Kampala in 1986. At the time he became president, Museveni was acting chairman of NRM following the untimely passing of then chairman, Yusufu Lule. Museveni and NRM have won elections since 1996 at gun point. By and large Obote used political negotiations (he used force in 1966) to gain political leadership while Museveni rose to and has stayed at the top through the barrel of the gun.

Obote’s governing philosophy contrasts with Museveni’s. Obote tried to level the playing field so that everyone could develop their capacities. In the 1960s, using donor and Uganda tax money, Obote constructed schools and hospitals largely in previously neglected rural areas. He delivered immunization programs, safe water and sanitation, improved shelter, clothing, food and nutrition security. In the labor market, Obote gave priority to Ugandans when a choice had to be made. Manufacturing progressed at a reasonable pace and created jobs. Obote built relatively good neighborly relations and consulted his cabinet on matters of national importance such as joining the East African political federation. The cabinet advised against it and Obote concurred. Thus, Obote’s economic and social policies narrowed income gaps and raised the general standard of living that has not been reached since 1970.

In contrast, Museveni has squandered the good will and financial support he obtained since 1987. First, he believes that Ugandans must be governed through fear at gun point and reduced to powerlessness and voicelessness through impoverishment as articulated in the 50 year master plan adopted in 1992. Consequently he has governed more by force than consultations. To frustrate dissent, he has invested donor funds and Uganda tax money disproportionately in the military, police, prisons and intelligence network at home and abroad. Second, a large proportion of the limited funds left over for development have been wasted through rampant corruption, patronage and mismanagement by unqualified or inexperienced staff in strategic ministries. Administrative expenses arising from dividing the country into over 120 districts have diverted development resources. At one time Uganda had 18 districts. Third, Museveni swallowed foreign economic advice lock, stock and barrel hoping that the invisible hand of market forces, laissez faire and trickledown economics would solve Uganda’s economic and social problems with minimum state involvement.

On Museveni’s watch Uganda has experienced skewed income distribution, high level of absolute poverty in excess of 50 percent, poor quality education and healthcare, worsening food and nutrition insecurity, high unemployment especially of youth, deteriorating infrastructure and institutions and environmental decay followed by a decline in the general standard of living. The current economic, social and ecological crisis is largely an accumulation of failures over the last 26 years presided over by Museveni – not external factors and Acts of God beyond NRM’s control as government officials have claimed. Museveni failed to balance macroeconomic stability and social needs as well as public and private roles in Uganda’s development. The resulting hunger and anger have triggered frustration leading to strikes and demonstrations. Resorting to force might add fuel to fire turning peaceful demands for change into a violent revolution.

What lessons have we learned? First, it appears that a person with a military background may not have the quality needed for national leadership in Uganda. By and large, soldiers-turned national leaders like Amin and Museveni in a developing context have difficulties in adjusting to civilian way of governing a nation that is based on persuasion and the rule of law. Second, the background of potential leaders must be clearly understood. Ugandans must demand to know the history, roots, work experience and position on major issues of public interest which should not be changed overnight once in power without convincing explanation. All Uganda leaders have burst onto the political stage rather abruptly allowing no room to scrutinize them.

Second, marriage of convenience should be discarded in favor of marriage of conviction. UPC/KY coalition was a marriage of convenience to block DP and we all know what it turned into. Those who join coalitions must be convinced about the mission, do not have to agree on everything initially but must have open mind and flexibility to revisit controversial issues in the hope of finding a mutually acceptable solution. Ambitious leaders tend to make empty promises simply to gain support. Once in power they forget or create obstacles for implementing what was promised. This betrayal has led to disappointments. It must be avoided in the future by picking leaders that exhibit honesty, modesty, pragmatism, knowledge and experience. Disagreement on an issue need not lead to rejection of a person or group of persons with a minority view. Decisions should be based on the balance of assets and liabilities.

Third, potential leaders need to articulate their views well in advance to allow sufficient time for public scrutiny. Unrecorded vague promises or populist statements should not alone form a basis to qualify anyone to lead Uganda. Positions on major issues such as land ownership and migration should be articulated in print. UDU has already prepared a National Recovery Plan (NRP) articulating policies and strategies to get Uganda out of the poverty trap onto a sustained high and equitable growth rate and sustainable development. The plan accessible at www.udugandans.org has been drawn up by the UDU committee based largely on location specific needs and endowments articulated by delegates at the Los Angeles conference in July 2011.

Eric Kashambuzi

Secretary-General, UDU

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