How Museveni has used structural adjustment to strangle opponents

People close to Museveni will tell you (on condition you do not quote them) that he believes very strongly in dominating others. Deep in his heart he thinks God created him specifically for that role which he must bequeath to a member of his family. Some Ugandans who want Museveni to favor them call him God send to save Uganda! Museveni has a mission much larger than Uganda. On April 4, 1997 he disclosed that “My mission is to see that Eritrea, Ethiopia, Sudan, Uganda, Kenya, Tanzania, Rwanda, Burundi and Zaire [DRC] become federal states under one nation [and one leader]” (EIR Special Report 1997). He might add on Somalia at a later stage if his troops perform well there.

Earlier Museveni had revealed that as a pan-Africanist he had larger ambitions and would quit Uganda politics as soon as security had been restored. His dream of Tutsi Empire and political and military involvement in Burundi, Rwanda and DRC as part of that dream is well known. In fact Mugabe joined the DRC war in 1998/99 principally to stop Museveni from creating a Tutsi Empire in Middle Africa (Joseph N. Weatherby 2003).

Assessment of NRM record and the way forward

As preparations for 2011 elections enter the final phase, it is appropriate to examine NRM’s successes and shortcomings and make recommendations for the next government.

NRM government dropped the ten-point program in favor of stabilization and structural adjustment program (SAP) following an agreement with the IMF in 1987. Prior to the signing of the agreement, the government ran the economy without external support and faced tremendous problems including inflation which ran into triple digits. In this environment, the government had no bargaining power and swallowed all IMF and the World Bank conditionality including employing external staff and advisers to direct the design and monitor the implementation of SAP.

From the start it was known that the first three to five years of structural adjustment would be very costly in social terms as the government adjusted its resources to make savings and repay its debts which were the main objective of the program. The comforting rhetoric was that the costs would disappear and benefits of economic growth would trickle down equitably to all Ugandans. Meanwhile Ugandans were requested to tighten their belts even tighter having lost thirty percent of their savings through the conversion of the old into the new currency. It was also understood that the role of the state in the economy would be significantly reduced to permit unhindered operation of the private sector. Resource allocation would be determined by the invisible hand of the market forces. In short neo-laissez-faire would drive Uganda’s economy and distribute the benefits.