What we have learned since Uganda’s independence in 1962

The discussions within UDU and other forums about the future of Uganda have necessitated an assessment of Uganda’s experience since independence in 1962. This is still work in progress but here are some preliminary findings. Your constructive comments are welcome.

1. Winner-take-all or government of exclusion has created many problems. Future governments should be inclusive on a proportional representation basis. Uganda’s population and natural diversity should be seen and used as an asset;

2. Notwithstanding political deficits, the civilian government in the 1960s performed much better in economic and social sectors than the succeeding military regime of the 1970s and military-turned democratic regime since 1986. Leaders with military background do not appear to be suitable for civilian administration.

3. Learning the art of governing a country on-the-job has proven to be the wrong approach. All the three presidents (Obote, Amin and Museveni) did not have what it takes at the beginning to govern, forcing them to rely on loyalty than competence. Future leaders must show experience, confidence and success in managing a large organization preferably with diverse characteristics as in Uganda. This would avoid or minimize parochialism which has become an endemic problem. Leaders that jump out of a ‘corn field’ onto a presidential stage no matter how educated they are should prove their practical experience. The issues of experience and character should be emphasized. Good character here refers to those leaders that in their lives have demonstrated distaste for corruption and nepotism and are conscious of good public image. When you become a leader you cannot afford to behave recklessly in private or public arena;

Uganda is thirsty & hungry for a new beginning

When a new road develops potholes in some sections after a period of intensive traffic use, a complete new surface may not be necessary if the potholes can be repaired in good time. However, as wear and tear takes its toll, large sections of the road become unsafe necessitating a new surface altogether on the entire section of the road. This resurfacing gives the road a new beginning that facilitates smooth, fast and yet safe driving.

Uganda received a new political surface in 1986 with the arrival of NRM system and its government because the political potholes were too many to fill up. The new political landscape permitted Ugandans in some sections of the country to engage in rapid economic growth and poverty reduction reaching a peak in the mid-1990s when the economic growth rate hit ten percent per annum.

Then the political landscape began to develop potholes beginning with signs of sectarianism, corruption and rigging of the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections. Attempts were made to fill up these political potholes by dismissing and censuring some ministers. Others lost reelection contests. Commissions of inquiry were instituted and institutions were established to restore political order.

Uganda is thirsty & hungry for a new beginning

When a new road develops potholes in some sections after a period of intensive traffic use, a complete new surface may not be necessary if the potholes can be repaired in good time. However, as wear and tear takes its toll, large sections of the road become unsafe necessitating a new surface altogether on the entire section of the road. This resurfacing gives the road a new beginning that facilitates smooth, fast and yet safe driving.

Uganda received a new political surface in 1986 with the arrival of NRM system and its government because the political potholes were too many to fill up. The new political landscape permitted Ugandans in some sections of the country to engage in rapid economic growth and poverty reduction reaching a peak in the mid-1990s when the economic growth rate hit ten percent per annum.

Then the political landscape began to develop potholes beginning with signs of sectarianism, corruption and rigging of the 1996 presidential and parliamentary elections. Attempts were made to fill up these political potholes by dismissing and censuring some ministers. Others lost reelection contests. Commissions of inquiry were instituted and institutions were established to restore political order.

How Museveni is silently turning Uganda into another Ivory Coast

It has been reported that migrant workers have triumphed over indigenous population in Ivory Coast’s presidential and parliamentary elections – essentially taking over the country. Museveni in collaboration with or under the direction of foreign advisers is methodically, silently and incrementally turning Uganda into another Ivory Coast. This is being done by increasing migrants through favorable policies and reducing indigenous population through birth control measures. I have already written an article (posted on home page of www.kashambuzi.com) arguing that immigrants will soon outnumber indigenous Ugandans. Let us see how Museveni is doing it beginning with policies that are encouraging foreigners to enter Uganda under conditions that are not clear to the public.

First, Museveni’s decision to adopt the shock therapy version of structural adjustment or economic recovery in 1987 was not an accident. It was designed to introduce unpopular decisions quickly before opposition groups organized to resist them. They also required dictatorial methods of governance which have been tacitly endorsed by Museveni’s foreign backers and conveniently described as bold leadership.