NRM has become a liability for its sponsors and supporters

The National Resistance Movement (NRM) came to power with domestic and external sponsors (those who fund and champion its cause) and gained supporters (those who are won over). The original sponsors and supporters of NRM inside Uganda had suffered political losses under Obote’s government – Catholics had lost elections twice to UPC and Buganda had lost the kingdom and ‘Lost counties’ referendum. Those who sponsored and supported NRM outside Uganda did not trust Obote despite his pledge to introduce capitalism under structural adjustment. They believed he was still a socialist and could not be trusted. The common characteristic is that those against Obote and UPC were in a hurry and could not wait for the next elections in 1985 or 1986 to defeat UPC that won the 1980 elections. They chose a military option for quicker results. Various guerrilla groups were formed, some of them merged into the NRM. NRM captured power in 1986 exactly five years when elections were due. So the results were not quicker but were clearly very destructive of lives, property and infrastructure and many deficits still remain unresolved.

The leadership of NRM comprised people who had lost to Obote and his party. The National Resistance Movement chairman was the late Yusufu Lule who served as post-Amin president for only 68 days. He was removed by the National Consultative Council (NCC) members many of them supporters of Obote and UPC. Museveni whose party won one seat in parliament in 1980 elections and Museveni himself lost a parliamentary seat in his home constituency became vice chairman. Besides vice chairman of NRM, Museveni also became commander of NRM’s guerrilla wing – National Resistance Army (NRA). Museveni was given these important responsibilities when his background and history were barely known. His birth place has remained a mystery to this day in 2012. He did not have a public or private experience to judge him by except in military training. This is an important lesson in choosing future leaders.

Museveni’s unhappy experience in the 1979/80 interim government and loss of an election in his home constituency in the 1980 elections made him realize how unpopular he was. He therefore chose to pursue his political ambitions by not trusting Ugandans but making promises – some of them impossible to honor or without a written record – to win them over. During the guerrilla war his trusted allies were Tutsi mercenaries who became commanders and heads of security, intelligence and other departments. Key Ugandans in the NRM were assigned diplomatic, political and administrative duties away from the army – his source of power and instrument with which to instill fear. He agreed to a ten point program which contained elements acceptable to donors like democracy, sovereignty of the people, ending corruption and sectarianism and conducting free and fair elections regularly and establishing good neighborly relations. Above all NRM promised to end the long suffering of the people of Uganda through quality education and health care, food and nutrition security, decent housing and clothing including shoes and restore land to owners who had been swindled etc (for details see the ten point program).

Museveni concurred even when he knew some elements did not fit into his ideology as manifested in the 50 year master plan to make Batutsi/Bahororo dominate Uganda and the Great Lakes region through creation of Tutsi Empire. He elaborated his mission in 1997 when he informed the world that his mission is to create a federation in the Horn of Africa and the Great Lakes regions. Uganda was therefore a stepping stone. That explains why Museveni’s focus is on East African economic integration and political federation which he has failed to explain convincingly. Large East African numbers of people (impoverished and with very low purchasing power) and a common passport for people (who have no money to buy tickets and afford hotel expenses) which NRM has used mostly as justification for integration and federation are not sufficient reasons for reaching and signing agreements. Starting with federation and then proceeding to integration which NRM favors is even worse. It’s like putting a cart before the horse or building a house starting with a roof. This rush is raising eyebrows as to the motive of the project. East Africans especially leaders need to move cautiously lest they commit terrible errors for present and future generations. NRM leaders and parliamentarians should recast and adjust accordingly or else you may jeopardize your legacy way beyond short term benefits some of them acquired probably through being corrupted.

NRM record has been disappointing to say the least. But those who have benefited from the regime at home and abroad refuse to see the obvious or conveniently sweep it under the rug/carpet hoping time will correct the situation. Under NRM leadership, absolute poverty has remained high and is still over 50 percent. Suffering has spread and deepened especially for some twenty percent in the lowest income bracket believed to have got poorer and the ‘new poor’ including those who were retrenched. Many who had at least two balanced meals a day are now eating one. Many people who ate meat once a week can now afford it once a month or not at all. The majority are subsisting on maize and cassava with adverse health implications. Some people who had been promised to get their land back have lost more under all sorts of manipulations including willing buyer and willing seller arrangements.

Honest people who welcomed NRM and Museveni as liberator are now saying they had never experienced or witnessed such suffering especially as a result of poor diet and health services. The number of people dying of malaria has doubled. This message of suffering came through loud and clear during religious sermons on 2011 Christmas Day. But NRM and a few sponsors continue to claim that Uganda’s economic growth and per capita income is better than in many African countries. If economic growth does not put food on the table for most Ugandans, it does not make sense to them to be told Uganda is doing just fine economically. Preachers of this message need to think again. The majority of Ugandans want change. But they don’t know how to get rid of the authoritarian regime. NRM has ruled through the instrument of fear and stealing elections. Spies are everywhere at home and abroad making it virtually impossible for many to express opinions even in their own homes much less outside their compounds. Defeating NRM at the ballot box has been ruled out because it has mustered the art of stealing elections. It will never accept willingly a true independent electoral commission, presidential term limits, independence of the judiciary and standardization of campaign finance because these are the instruments that have kept NRM in power.

But there is some good news. Fear is turning into boldness and hope, albeit slowly. Ugandans at home and abroad are beginning to realize that staying afraid of guns and spies etc will make them worse. They are drawing lessons from those that have liberated themselves in distant past and places and more recently from authoritarian regimes that were as repressive and armed to the teeth as Uganda’s if not more and are beginning to shed fear and take some risks. Some are saying openly that they are not afraid of dying for a good cause. NRM and its security forces are being reminded regularly that committing crimes against humanity could land them in the International Criminal Court or lead to imposition of sanctions by development partners some of whom have already issued warnings through press releases and others are having private discussions with NRM authorities although what is discussed and agreed upon may not be disclosed to the public. Various methods of righting what has gone wrong in Uganda are being worked out. Non-violent resistance or negotiating a transitional government is among them.

External supporters are also disappointed but many are reluctant to drop NRM and its leader Museveni, not realizing that NRM successors could deliver better outcomes for them too. They generously funded structural adjustment program (SAP) and protected Museveni against criticism including delaying multi-party politics and tacitly allowing him to build strong security forces to suppress dissent against SAP adverse impact. Donors wanted SAP to succeed as an economic model for third world development through market forces and laissez faire capitalism. But they made one major mistake. They turned a blind eye to rampant corruption, sectarianism and incompetence of many NRM cadres that are the primary cause for failure of structural adjustment in Uganda. In Chile and Ghana where necessary adjustments were made (including dismissing the entire team of economists in Chile directly involved in neo-liberal reform) there has been good progress. Neo-liberalism can still work in Uganda but only under different leadership that is flexible and accountable to the people who are sovereign. The National Recovery Plan (NRP) developed by UDU is an alternative to NRM policies. It was drawn up on the basis of public and private partnership.

Museveni was crowned dean of the new breed of African leaders that would champion peace, democracy and free market – the three ideas that have conquered much of the world. However, after more than twenty five years in power, Museveni has not brought about peace in Uganda and in the great lakes region. Plundering Congo’s resources, interference in internal affairs of member states of African Union and allegations that Uganda troops participated in Hutu genocide in DRC have tarnished the image of NRM and its leader. Overall NRM has contributed to potential political instability that if not checked quickly could plunge the great lakes region into a civil war. Prevention is always better than cure.

When an investment makes heavy losses for quite some time, there is no point in continuing to put in more money. The best thing is to appoint new directors to reorganize the company. Uganda is at that point – it needs new managers. Continuing to support NRM with its incurable corrupt and sectarian practices is unwise. Waiting to defeat it in 2016 is unlikely; NRM will steal the elections. It has done it before and congratulated. NRM has lost the will and capacity to do better no matter what its sponsors and supporters at home and abroad may want us to believe. The earlier we realize this and take appropriate measures the better for all Ugandans, development partners, friends and well wishers.

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